From Service to Self-Interest: Civil Servants, Government Contracts and Corrupted Market Competition in Namibia

Abstract

In Namibia, a loophole allows civil servants to bid for government tenders, creating conflicts of interest. This "non-rule" enables profit-seeking civil servants to compete with private firms they are supposed to serve. The article explores whether this practice constitutes corruption and violates competition law. Using the "Fishrot Files" scandal as a case study, the author argues that allowing civil servants to bid for contracts creates institutionalized corruption and undermines fair competition. The article contends that civil servants have informational advantages over private bidders, creating an uneven playing field that diminishes competition and wastes taxpayer funds. The study highlights the need for policymakers to reconsider the policy and ensure transparent, competitive, and conflict-free public procurement processes. The findings offer valuable insights for Namibia and other jurisdictions with similar non-rules, emphasizing the importance of fair competition and integrity in public procurement.