

Research essay

Absurdism and Logical Positivism in Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There*

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Abstract

The focus of this essay is a careful examination of Absurdism in Lewis Carroll's 'Alice in Wonderland'. There will be additional focus on some of his poetry, his lifelong vocation as a mathematician and its influence in his writing. This essay will also include a discussion on the philosophy of language, logical positivism, mathematical absurdity, and the influx state of the in between.

Introduction

Foucault in *The Order of Things* observes that systems are composed of signs and symbols that emulate language: 'Once the existence of language has been eliminated, all that remains is its function in representation' (Foucault 90). It is in breaking down these systems into empirical and esoteric language use that we isolate the 'true' purposes of language use in communication. Transparency and Clarity in its absoluteness becomes the sub-quantification factor in content communication and a reader's comprehension. Their pursuit and eventual end operate under a strict paradigm of cause and effect in which the applied proofs

have yielded particular results that are uncontested. In such 'evidence based' arguments dialogues are erected around certain structures and it is in these classic structures that empirical language occludes the metaphysical interpretations of their constituents by applying conscious limitations against contradictory proofs. They actively indicate the subscripts in such arguments and classify all non-logical entities as 'nonsensical' and 'absurd'. Contradictory proofs occur when the artistic predicates in language use are proposed within the classical formal framework.

While such an approach is feasible for other scientific fields of thought such as Mathematics and physics, consciously trying to weave this into literature texts has major drawbacks. The language system in literary texts is entirely metaphysical (Foucault 38), and absolute logic is very rarely left out of the relativism of comprehension and propositions against interpretational absolutism. Metaphysical language use is reliant on its contextual environment and its inclusion of variations transforms concepts from single occasional use to a multiplicity.

When Lewis Carroll set out to pen *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*, he worked within the single supposition of classical language use. In this he could confidently advance his own counter theorems against the rising non-Euclidean mathematicians in a conceptual empirical environment. Themes in Non-Euclidian mathematics and unknown vectors in Geometry did not fit his classicist worldview of a purely objective and empirical representation. Mathematical postulations from academics like Jean Poncelet and his Projective geometry that violated the singular universal set of classification and William Hamilton's abstract geometry flew in the face of empirical masterpieces. However, as Foucault

observes, language be it empirical or artistic is still encased in a metaphysical construction that is never quite still in its interpretation. By having symbols and objects of matter occupy this field, a complexity occurs. Symbols and objects are instruments in the Sketch and are indeterminable in their ways of presentation. They are an aesthetic presentation of what could occur beyond one-sided stereotypical conclusions. Carroll's single conceptual empirical language environment opened up his classically based work to the multiplicity of interpretation. What was once framed in empirical absolutism becomes gaseous in commutative exchange. Alice finds this kind of description more fairytale-esque in Wonderland when she questions her body's girth in relation to her environment. Her body has become too big in the white rabbit's home, a corollary to being unable to understand her present circumstance. Alice's body is a metaphoric representation of the locked classical language and its inability to advance beyond its interpretation:

'Oh, you foolish Alice! [...]How can you learn lessons in here? Why, there's hardly any room or you and no room at all for any lesson books!' (Carroll 42).

Her coordinates are so absolute that anything beyond it can only be the fantastical. Wittgenstein calls this our evangelical approach to language, where the depth of language is scrapped for a single logical reasoning. This is the no-nonsense approach fundamentally designed to scrap ingenuity. (Binkley 27)¹.

¹ Wittgenstein calls our attention to how varied individual descriptions can be. A body for instance can be described in terms of mood, facial expressions or its coordinates in an environment.

This work however is concerned with the 'dark mass' of the unseen and uncharted propositions that lie within all language and particularly in *Alice in Wonderland*. We will investigate Wittgenstein's aberrant Sketch as an entity of propositions and theorems that exist beyond the accepted formalism of classical language and logical positivism (*Tractus.Logicus* 4.5). While we are slaves to The Picture, tracing our meanings over and over around the border of The Frame, we fail in distinguishing the Real from the Created. Wittgenstein argues that language use is like the observation of The Picture (Binkley 89). Grammar and logic have often been taken to represent equivalent concept formation. Wittgenstein wants us to look at language as a human activity, alive and organic without a vapid singular skeletal structure.² Our tracings around its Frame are the empirical motif we exert on the Classical use of language. Language in Picture use is clarified of most metaphysical interpretations and relies heavily on an empirical working. The first part of our argument in this paper will be a short introduction into this Classical vs Absurdist worldview. While we operate wholly within the Classic logical positivisms of language, there are those aberrant musings into the absurd we reserve for the uninitiated, often children and their literature. The absurdist use of language is a 'muddled affair' from which logic cannot be explicated.

Our second part shall focus on the consequences of 'depthless, clean and rational' language and its metaphysical interpretations in *Wonderland*. This 'clarified'

² When I say a game consists of moving objects around a surface according to certain rules, you might think of a board game, but there are others (chess, scrabble etc). Basically, you make your definition correct by restricting your options to certain rules.
Investigations

form does more than occlude the dimensions of language use; it denies and compresses useful predicate propositions that advance theorems in linguistic interpretation and language understanding. This formalism (Binkley 26) is an irregular secular model whose heuristic design is not as all-encompassing as previously thought. Following Wittgenstein's Sketch postulations of language as organic phenomena, we find pockets between forced model interpretations and the disregarded Sketch where the aberrant dark mass paradoxically becomes the violated and intruded upon entity. For Carroll, these pockets decry his mono-linguistic logical positivist interpretation of Wonderland and, unwillingly or not, opens up the world to the Absurd through Alice's final concession of The Sketch. Our absolutist logical understanding becomes Sisyphus' rolling stone from Camus' myth and only an investigation towards this Truth fallacy is beneficial towards pursuing not only a truly creative environment that permits all manner of interpretation for phenomena but a substantial query on the thoughtlessness of conventional meaning and its resultant absurdities.

The Mock Turtle Theory

Isaac Asimov once observed that '... the most exciting phrase' in the progress of science and understanding was not 'Eureka!' but rather a sheepish, amused 'huh, that's funny' dub of confirmation (Pinker 27). Language and its pursuit in logic and comprehension often trigger the same failsafe in conceptual understanding beyond the 'logical'. The Conventional rules of grammar values learnt early in life state that words changing from Singular – Plural often have the tagged addition of the 'S' suffix; Cat- cats, tree- trees, etc.

It's a common mistake, therefore, for mouse to become mouses. The children have acquired a very simple model and are apt to apply it to everything. Naturally, they are corrected and introduced to yet another model in the pre-existing simple plural schema. From this, we can successfully derive that there are systems that govern language and simple systems make up the basic construction and are easily assimilated to everyday language, unlike the complex systems which require a more in depth knowledge of the schemata to better derive branching pieces of theorems. Mistakes in simple systems are easily rectified and correction is almost always a one- step revision enterprise. The child learns the 'es' or 's' in cats and mouse exhibit modulatory behaviour³ in presenting the quantity. They then learn that this interpretation works on some cases and not all. They learn to distinguish that from mouse and louse, we have mice and lice. When these predestined interpretations are missed, the language structure and meaning appears aberrant in the empirical context.

The child's 'mistake' can be chalked to an inconsistency in observation where a single theorem is incorrectly appropriated to fit an interpretation. This postulation leads to observation overwhelming actual reason. It's an understandable mode of thought since language is so old and its fundamental roots lie exposed (Binkley 28). The child has merely been inducted into the basic low-level tier of the Simple system of the automatic Cat-cats concept and this correction turns their attention to the complexities and hierarchies that occur in the simple S system. They learn the

³ Certain words fall under certain adaption in their suffix plural endings. Cat becomes cats and Potato- potatoes. Some words completely scrap the modulation suffix and retain their form if not their conceptual quantity eg milk-milk, sugar-sugar

interlocking schemata that make up grammatical logic goes beyond the basic. However, the predominant Classical formalistic system ensures that their version of what is rationally acceptable lines up with the empirical observance of language use. Yet one could argue, on some moral grey theoretical axiom, that the plural of mouse can be mouses. Elizabeth Constance Jones' Law of Predication which investigated the lengths a statement could logically occur before it was categorised as improper. Jones investigated Lotze's claim of Identity and Negation in sets. Statement S was S because it could never be P, similarly, P was P because it could never be S. Similar statements identify with their constituent makeup while the opposing ones cancel each other out. Absurdities occur when S is not S and may in fact be an extension of P. In this case, S is P. There is a set dualism of existence and contradictions between the two exist in states of negation. By this process, the value set of mouse-mouses is a properly *improper* form of statement that can only exist in the nebulae of 'lfs' and never in the conventional Absolutes⁴. In Conventional systems, F-systems are set in their injunctions and do not recognize or admit inferior system theorems. As a mathematician and logician, Lewis Carroll was especially sensitive to patterns of cognition and logic in all available systems and showed a keen interest for them in his childhood (Derek 25). As a Euclidian enthusiast, he was keen on the dualistic construction of Logic. He believed strongly that the internal machinations of all systems reflected the same patterned external structure. Simply put, a spade was a spade, a bill a bill, and one *could not* paint white roses red and call them such. They were white roses *painted red*; they

⁴ The author Ian M. Banks rightly noted that it is only by correction that the child learns that S is not always S purely because the dominant theorem interpretation demands it (Less Wrong 5)

could never be red roses. From a logician's point of view, such statements were obtuse, absurd and lacked the general classical structure that made coherent statements true. In Gilbert Ryle's 'Ghost in the machine' theory, perception is taken in through two key areas: the body and the mind (Addis 5). He argues that these two exist in the same sense of now, simultaneously taking in dual experiences at a constant frequency. However, their individual conceptual interpretations differ. In his theory of Cartography, Ryle demonstrates the use of language as a specialized set skill that changes according to one's environmental occupation⁵. Consider this, however; we argue that half of that statement is right. Bodies do logically inhabit the present at all given moments, the 'mind however is only linked in the now in the sense of being aware of the present. Yet minds act as chessboards, able to traverse past, present and future landscapes, anticipating the space and self of potential movements in various scenarios. Bodies may have a finite web of existence living in the now, but minds transcend this. This opens up the question of Wittgenstein's Sketch. The body would accept the conventional Now but the Mind, would chart probable moves on the logical and illogical spaces of the chessboard. If we take *Alice in Wonderland* as Lewis Carroll's chessboard of which it predominantly is in terms of 'correcting' mathematical errors, then each piece or character would reflect some aspect of himself in both external (body) and internal (mental) associations. Consequently, the work is a kind of multi-plane dialogue with

⁵ A villager considering a red apple would refer to it as red but a scientist might point out to the different shades of red, a mathematician might break down 'red' into infinitesimals. While they all talk about the apple 'stock', they have different conceptual approaches.

himself, his world, world views and his conventions. The entire work could a Schrodinger apposite compilation of what *Is* and *should not be but Is*. If mathematical epistemology is not finite and we apply the philosophical infinitesimals in mathematical and ordinary language, then would not what was once illogical fit into the revamped logical space?

Wittgenstein's Landscape postulates that absolute form of observation is not N but $N + 1$ (Bingley 86). The 'detached, unassertive and protean' forms of the polymorphous language sketch should be allowed to speak for itself (Bingley 43). In this train of thought, we can begin our argument and take N as a syllogism for Normality and the classical use of language, keeping to the theme of The Picture and symbols as condensed forms of language. The basics of perception are not wholly encapsulated and immediate, and this Sketch postulate has the extra 'unassertive determinant' (+1). The Sketch Landscape is a rough terrain, a snapshot of Could be's; before conformity and classicism striates and compartmentalizes it into Logic. It is the dense composite without particular purpose, the rabbit hole crammed with bookshelves and empty marmalade jars. Alice could curtsy as she fell, and the action would straddle the grey between the certain and the uncertain because it has not attained the Form of The Picture yet. The Form is the absolute, accepted convention of The Picture. It intrudes into the Sketch of the Landscape and separates the black from the white. The Form redacts the Sketch into negation and feeds on idealism, rejecting the multiplicity of existence beyond the set logic.

Wittgenstein calls it 'the depth of the ordinary' (Bingley 25), where the ordinary set logic of S is S as a formal empirical sentence is presented in extraordinary circumstances. He argues that the Sketch- absurd is just a grainy, deeper mode

of representation that has always been present but due to its unempirical roots, it is discarded without further study. In mathematical logic, the extraordinary sketch would be the undeterminable negatives and the complex (i) imaginary numbers in abstract algebra that lack the concrete determinacy of Euclidean geometry. Wittgenstein's Sketch postulate presents the Absurd as the amputated limb of the Logic.

The Prime figures in the main theorem act both as the logical finite interpretations but also as the signposts that fray the tightly knit web of conventional analytic Logic. Escher's monographs call them the Figures and the Ground (Hofstaeder 70). The Dutch graphic artist represented logic and the absurd as entwined fields that were linked in Strange Loops. These Loop drawings stimulated the arts by focusing on the presence of illusion and paradoxes that existed between the two. The Figures are the conventional Forms of logic that are externally explicable in their syntactical constructions. The Ground is the Sketch, the vague background from which the uncertainty of the Figure-Form claims originates.

If we talk of the Prime as having within it factor- signpost figures that ultimately result in the N system, our next step would be the isolation of the Prime theorem. An easy example and one that lends itself readily in *Alice in Wonderland* is the simple childlike logic Alice uses to try and navigate her way in Wonderland. One understands that as a seven-year-old girl, her mind does not work in quite the same way as an adult's. She is more open to acknowledging the Sketch in Logic and the tendrils that tether her to the Form are still in development. She is not fully realized and initiated into the conventional Logic of seeing things. Bertrand Russell notes in his *Philosophy*

of *Logical Atomism* that 'highly educated [people see, hear, feel and do everything] in a very different way from a young child or animal' (Russell 5). Her arguments for Logic are causal connections with the Form and follow a predictable pattern of the world and reality as a dual black vs. white perception. When she finds herself in a too small room, she wants to 'shut up like a telescope' (Carroll 12) since it is the only object that cartographically works in such dimensions whilst keeping its original form. Our journey into Wonderland can begin on these grounds by presenting the Form as Alice would understand it in its simplest language.

The dualism of the world and reality is secured firmly in the prejudices of what *is* (the certainties that are backed up by empirical evidence) and what is *not* (those uncertainties that make up The Sketch). Alice's reality is similarly mapped out. Prior to falling through the rabbit hole, she is a daughter of rationality; a sound Miss who does not let an improbable and seemingly never-ending fall through unusual rabbit holes detract her from the *improperness* of the situation:

'Well! After such a fall as this I shall think nothing of tumbling down stairs! How brave they'll all think of me at home! Why, I wouldn't say anything about it, even if I fell off the top of the house!' (Carroll 6).

In fact, one of her earliest observations is a relative continuum between this actual fall and a theoretical tumble down the stairs (Carroll 7). This is the childlike determination of the formalist in training. Her classical roots are evident as she presents before the reader all the plausible dimensions of the Form to rationalise her current predicament. Her formalist understanding of the universe states that everything that goes up must come down. Consequently, everything that *does* fall

down must land eventually. There is no such thing as flying or intractable suspension in the air. Gravity has business with objects and that is keeping them on the ground⁶.

Our representation of the classical F-system Form would mirror Alice's simplicity; let it be an absolute $2+2=4$ theorem. This is the Landscape's conventional truth backed by empirical evidence ($4-2=2$) etc. Using the pq system, Douglas Hofstadter observes and tests the limit of this empirical design in factual representation. The F-system pq of the Form in Wittgenstein's and our postulation of $2+2 = 4$ is: - -p- -q- - - - where p is plus and q is equals (Hofstaeder 64). We shall use this same model to extend our own explications into monographs by Escher and language derivatives from Ryle's Cartographic logic, Moore's theories and Wittgenstein's Landscape as they apply in Wonderlandian logic.

Anais Nin once observed that 'we don't see things as they are, we see things as we are' (26). To quantify our environment, we have reduced existence and communication to a linear scale, brought it down to an ideal level to easily acquaint ourselves with it. We have made what is essentially universal into a dualistic version of what can and cannot be permitted. Alice's pq F -system works along the same lines. She tries to scale down Wonderland to her own point of view in an attempt to better quantify and explain its oddness. The rabbit hole for instance she expects to be finite: 'Down, down, down. Would the fall *never* come to an end!' (Carroll 6). Rabbit holes, even ones that coerce rational young girls and are inhabited by odd rabbits must have coherent dimensions. What is open at one end must have its

⁶ We work on the assumption that Alice had some business with gravity and motion in her schoolroom with her talk of Australia and antipathies.

conclusion at another end. These dimensions, Alice assures us, are charted according to our own linear geometry. The pq system is present in the scientific properties of gravity in rabbit holes and with Einstein's theory of acceleration slowing as one nears the core before speeding up again towards the other end. However, this is far too advanced for Alice⁷, a point she notes begrudgingly.

But these are all explications from our initial basic F-system axiom, of which, based on its simplicity, we have established to be a sound one and thus elevated it to a theorem. Classically, we have applied hypothesis to form proof to theorem. Modifying our F-system, we can hypothesize that given Wonderland's leaning and Carroll's logician background, the pq system's ultimate solution would be Alice's emergence into the perfect Garden. The symbolism is apparent. The perfect Garden beyond the curtain is synonymous with the graceful Euclidian geometry that Carroll favoured. All theoretical properties and conjectures lend themselves to an eventual harmonious end. However, to get there, the disproportionate factors must be whittled away, eliminated or assimilated into the conventional. The absurdity of Language features in this by deriving from the $pq (N)$ of the Form when Logical positivism runs into a paradox. Bertrand Russell notes this as the paradox in classical logic (Russell 20). When a statement under the Law of Predicate theorem results in a derivative or contradiction from the expected outcome, a Russell paradox occurs. Each statement as per logical positivism dictation grounds itself in its nature to be a finite close circuit argument. Language use

⁷ Gardner in *The Annotated Alice Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass* makes the comparison of the Rabbit Hole and the emergent theories in Mobius Strip, a projective geometry that utilized gravitational properties in running trains.

in the F-system is particular in its character *and* its characterization. Properties attributed to its subjects are applicable only to that subject and do not open up into the descriptive or the metaphorical.

For example, the statement: 'Alice is tall' in ordinary language that the individual Alice has the property of being tall and nothing else. This is the only information available to us and this is the first and only interpretation. It is a concrete, finite set of values. Consider this next statement: 'Alice tells tall tales'. We infer the metaphorical and the descriptive. By this margin, an idealist would conclude that it is not a sound statement, given that the cartography of the language opens up to ambiguous and multiple interpretation. Consequently, were the Form to interpret this literally, Alice, the subject tells literal tall tales. Semantically, this is unsound so the Form gives way to the Sketch, the Origin $N + 1(x)$. From this we extrapolate that the subject Alice has a fondness for stretching the truth of actual events and may in fact be a liar.

On Rabbits in Waistcoats, Linear Lines, and Logical Positivism.

Having established that the Sketch in the Landscape exists, we can then postulate that Albert Camus' view on Logic is also sound. Absolute logic, and man's determination to achieve and ascertain it is a fruitless task. It's a Sisyphean effort that yields no desirable results. Camus' Sisyphean philosophy can be overlaid in our F-system. Through this, we can extrapolate Russell's Paradox and achieve the Form's dreaded isomorph multiplicity.

If $p \rightarrow q$ is $2+2=4$, we can derive that Camus claims that this is not a completely sound composite since logical interpretation isn't the only avenue to understanding a statement fixed in this axiom. Thus, we can substitute our later example of 'Alice is Tall'. This fits the theorem. However, 'Alice tells tall tales doesn't'. When we take the theorem to stand for a *statement*, rather than just a mathematical proposition, then the theorem has to capitulate to the paradox's nature of ambiguity and multiplicity in interpretation. In the statement Alice tells tall tales, the set values for a classical understanding are in place but our *interpretation* moves into the metaphorical. We have to refer to the Sketch to make sense of it though the Form's signposts are easy enough to match. The properties surrounding the equation of the linguistic syntactic and semantics are easily unravelled to produce the necessary interpretation.

Carroll was aware of the logician's steps of development and encoding one needed to fund mathematical inquiry. Geometry was straightforward, Euclidian even more so. Euclidian geometry states that any four points on a straight line equal to zero. A straight line has points A, B, C and D. Ordinary language plays to similar styles in set values for logical positivist cases. Thus, one can't completely disparage truisms formed from such Carrollian intrigues. What happens then, when epistemological systems meet open complex ones?

When we say F-System epistemological sets, we mean theorems and statements that are empirical.

A.....B.....C.....D

Euclidian geometry states that $L AB=L BC$. Thus, we can infer that $L BC=L CD$ with no points of intersection. Points of

intersection in parallel lines occur when we input rotation figures.

So, a white Rabbit in a waistcoat contains all the hallmarks that parallel a figure of civilized rationality. He talks, wears a sensible waistcoat, and seems to be thriving somewhat in the hustle and bustle of the economy of life. Alice follows the creature with all the intention of interrogating it for, all things aside '...at the time it all seemed quite natural' (Carroll 4). The white rabbit anthropologically fits the Euclidian ideal of the perfect parallel. $L AB = L BC = L CD$ which in Wittgenstein's postulation is the norm for the Form. The Sketch is what Alice observes secondly, as is expected from a child raised in idealist classical logic:

'..but when the Rabbit actually *took a watch out of its waistcoat- pocket*, and looked at it then hurried on, Alice started to her feet, for it flashed across her mind that she had never before seen a rabbit with either a waistcoat pocket, or a watch to take out of it...' (4).

This is the classic scenario of the Form reacting to the Sketch. Alice's and in turn, Carroll's pursuit of the White Rabbit is Logic's determination to catch and wrestle errant deterministic values that do not conform to the F-system's perception the world into submission. As she falls, Alice ruminates on thoughts of her cat Dinah who like many cats, has a fondness for rats:

'Dinah'll miss me very much I tonight, I should think! I hope they'll remember her saucer of milk at tea time. Dinah, my dear! I wish you were down here with me! There's no mice in the air, I'm afraid, but you might catch a bat, and that's very like a mouse you know.' (7).

Her proposition in this odd scene whilst freefalling revolves around thoughts of cats, bats and rats in a cyclical tangle that may seem nonsensical as Carroll notes that she is a bit sleepy. Would this be Carroll's way of mocking the Sketch by presenting the Sketch language as a phantasmagoria eclectic collection of concepts? Perhaps. But consider Dinah the cat as the value-factor in question to puzzle it out. Transplanting her from a London country house will not change her appetite for rodents. If her natural environment were a perpetual free fall, wouldn't she substitute rats for bats? They are just rats with extra appendages. Undoubtedly entertaining, this short absurd thought can be seen as a further gateway into a subversion of F- system set rules of the Form. Alice is in very dangerous territory when entertaining such statements that share so many close-set values from the original form but do not yet have the desired net sum.

At this point, we can sufficiently state that Alice's Form mind has been rattled some and landing in the bottom of the rabbit hole does not provide ready answers. Her proportions are at odds with her environment. Logic looms large in the hallways as the F-system theorem tries to overcompensate her integration into a new schema. As a figure contained in a Euclidian boundary, Alice's stature now oscillates between Up London Rationality as it meets Down Wonderland's Sketch schema. Her only means to traverse this domain would be by consuming the Potion and the Cake. The instructions are easy enough; EAT ME, DRINK ME. This is a one of the simplistic ways of acclimating to any situation. It requires no rigorous mental or physical activity and it is the perfect solution for a young girl who has tumbled into fairyland.

Carroll had different designs on the potion and the cake. They are experiential propositions on the absurdity of the pre-requisite requirements required to explore. Mathematical inquiry and debate were and still is a system that requires empirical evidence to support a proposed hypothesis. In Carroll's time, Victorian England was subject to the 4th dimension matter intrigue. Hamilton's proposition of imaginary quantities that could be subject to solid geometric progression was sacrilege. It's Carroll's postulation that the cake and potion contain these imaginary quantities. If Alice needed to shrink to go through the doors, it stands to reason that Logic would be employed to some far-reaching parameters. It is a barb on progress that Alice doesn't do this, *cannot* do this. As a child, Alice is in no position to question higher innate wisdom that she knows nothing about. The mathematical propositions are seen as through the eyes of a child as lacking in substance and mockeries of real events. This kind of progress is the stuff of children's stories. Subsequently, we may as well deftly handle this chessboard with some finesse like a well-constructed equation. Only through empiricism and epistemological Logic can we sufficiently and effectively point out the flaws of the new theorems and successively debunk them.


A Caterpillar's Advice on Keeping Temper: Isomorphs, Depth and Perceptions in the Pool of Tears

At this point we contend that Alice holds onto the Form (N) mono truism of ordinary language in the F-system while attempting to navigate the zoomorphism that is N+1 Sketch-System of Wonderland. Embedding the laws of the F-System onto experiential Wonderlandian logic, we postulate with a


degree of high certainty (although this is not absolute) that Carroll was attempting a massive deconstruction and reconstruction of the dualism in F System and S-system frameworks. Logical F-System factors make a futile attempt via Alice's immediate incomprehension to absorb the S-system into itself by incorporating the schemata into its own. Factors that are incomprehensible, such as never-ending rabbit holes can be broken down into empirical units and framing the S-system (N+1) schemata into *comprehensible* terms that fit the dialectic of the F-System (N) structure. An instance of this is when the White Rabbit drops his kid gloves and fan. Alice picks them up and appropriates their nature's property from the Sketch (as the White Rabbit's possessions) to her own (validating them into the Formal system as logical items of clothing) and begins fanning herself. Carroll intended language to work in a similar manner and sought to represent its use the Pool of Tears. We remember that Wonderland was a Sketch representation to refute the mathematical advancement of Victorian Society. Through this large-scale isomorphism, we postulate that Carroll via Alice understood the massive incongruity that existed between Wonderlandian metaphysical Logic and the traditional conventional structure of the F-System of Mathematical Euclidian absolutes.

Moreover, Carroll has effectively embedded his isomorphic dualistic postulate as a Euclidian case of parallel lines; two entities that happen to run along a similar route yet can never meet. It is a curious advancement, owing to the fact that Carroll's initial objective was the presentation of Wonderland/ Mathematical advancement as a case that lacked in sense on grounds of its failure to comply to the absolutism of Euclidean and metaphysical Logic of the F-System. In essence, Carroll dualism can be charted as two parallel lines representing this train of thought:

(N) F-System: Absolute Logic/ Logical Positivism



(N+1) S-System (Sketch): Absurdist/ Mathematics advancement



Our next postulation and chessboard move is to observe Carroll's acknowledgement that for a dualism to exist, there must be a point of origin. Since Alice/ Carroll tried to subsume the absurdity into the F- System Logic, we hypothesize that he must concede that the two are in fact not absolute dualistic principles with different point of origins. If we do take this and in turn incorporate our own hypothesis to this F-System Beta Model, we arrive at a peculiar point of origin where the dualism is both present and absent. In this realm of thought, when sets from the Formal-System (N) schemata attempt to appropriate factors from the S-system (N+1) schemata it becomes a Russell's Paradox. In this case, sets from the F System can be charted as integers $F(N) > S(N+1)$. Carroll's deconstruction and reconstruction of this traditional schema is: F (where F is the Formal System of logical positivism and absolute Logic in a given schemata), we substitute it into the Function of theory/ possible inferences in a given arc- sphere and present our proposed Russell's Paradox in the schemata. See Appendix A for the denser parts of the argument and accompanying equations.

Following Ryle's Cartography metaphor of perceptions, Wittgenstein Landscape and Sketch presents grammar and its use as an application reliant on the user's conceptual understanding for their immediate environment. However, this application is not always immediate and empirical.

Conceptual description is firstly concerned with the user's imagination. Consider the microscope, without its aid, we are ignorant to the microcosm world. This does not mean that it doesn't exist. The microcosm is the Sketch and the essence of the phenomena. Our understanding does not have to be a penetration of this phenomenon that results in cherry picking the best factors to incorporate to the logical positivism of 'ordinary language'. Instead, Wittgenstein calls for a conceptual consideration of the possibilities that are represented in these microcosm Landscapes. Carroll fails in this because he uses grammar to point out at the single concept logic of logical positivism and categorises any factor that cannot be assimilated into this connection as absurd. Consequently, he fails in understanding the infinitesimal concepts of the Sketch's essence phenomena in grammar and language use. The Queen's red roses are an excellent example into this zoomed in grammar use⁸.

Who painted the roses red is a Russell's Paradox where the overarching set of representation (the roses are flowers; as flowers) is the one true distinguishing factor that can be termed as 'true' and logical. Individual aesthetic presentation (white roses or red roses) are a subset of the overarching set. However, when outside particulars are *painted on* and a set purports to progress as *is* without taking account of the consequential new tangents, then a problem arises. Russell's Paradox states that if sets are governed by universal principles of belonging, then everything belongs to a set. If everything belongs to a set, then it belongs to a set of *something*. Consequently, this set of belonging to something means that Separation Axiom sets are unnecessary when constructing sets. As opposed to mathematics, Actual construction of sets

⁸ See Appendix A.

in language is not a finitely determined action. Language is fluid and organic and only when clarified into logical positivism and empirical conceptualization can we say that finite sets exist. When Carroll sought to represent the Wonderlandian logic Sketch in the Formal System Logic, he triggered the unrestricted comprehension axiom, wherein grammar perception zoomed into the Sketch possibilities and connections. Red roses may belong to the sets (Red, Rose and Flowers) but painted red roses that were once white cannot belong to their own sets since logically, they aren't red. However, they do belong to a set of red roses that were previously white and in this, they satisfy the set requirements of Red, Rose and Flowers. Hence, they are and are not part of the Set. By trying to apply the logical positivist set onto the absurdity of Wonderland, he failed to take in account the *actual* meaning these individual factors may have.

Carroll's attempted erasure and amalgamation will be presented in one finite domain (n) in our spherical representation of Euclidian geometry⁹. As we advanced above, Carroll's move towards the convergence of the two schema means that he may have envisioned the two to spring from a common source. The arc in the sphere comes from the multitude sense- data the reader perceives as they read and interpret a situation. The F-system (N) Logic would have it as a strict linear progression, but the Sketch of Wonderlandian Logic invites the reader to *arc* from the linear and explore the multiplicities of causality and free will.

As a logician, Carroll may have considered the evolving theories in mathematics as sets of their own trying to

⁹ See Appendix B on Carroll's Domain specific amalgamation and the finite limits attempted on language.

incorporate themselves in the Euclidean spheres. By writing Wonderland to refute them, he may have investigated the limits of logic in these wayward theories and set the stage for logical positivism debates for later philosophers. The Mouse's insistence on the 'It' in his speech in The Pool of Tears exemplifies the need for things to be understood as belonging to certain sets and scenarios. The Mouse does not have to elaborate what 'it' is not even to the Duck who operates on the concept that language is not finite in concept interpretation. 'it' could 'generally [well be] a frog or a worm' (Carroll 29)¹⁰.

Once again, Alice is convinced that there is one singular path to the perfect garden. What she needs to get here is a guide, one who can incorporate the Wonderlandian Logic into her own and effectively produce a sense data composite that factors the two but is still *framed* within the domain of the arc segment $[F(x) N (+1)]$. The Cheshire Cat fits this model but his active participation in this data extrapolation has the consequence of exposing Carroll's work

¹⁰ The domains preclude the assumption that the 'wild' Wonderlandian Logic is primitive, ie, lacking in the necessary prerequisites needed for logical analytic deconstruction. The primitive is logically inferior and the reader's mind arrives to it through a furtive surface analysis, what Bertrand Russell calls the psychology of primitivism (Russell 76). The eternal world is composed of objects which are processed in our minds as sense data. The primitive is the surface detail, the automatic response and judgement in a situation. The logical is the psychological derivative from various judgements that *always* amounts to a singular linear interpretation of logical truth. Alice's Wonderlandian adventures are consistently based on the logical tractus, the belief that all known and unknowns are absolute linears and have only a singular interpretation. The derivative (+1) exists merely to pander to the logical linear interpretation.

as a massive Russell Paradox. While the interpretation of the surface quality is seen as primitive due to its unfettered largesse of unanalysed sense data, the paradox lies in the *finite* closed system's inability to offer numerous interpretations for a given scenario or sense propositions. In this way, we may say that the F-System Logic is the primitive one and the S-System Sketch the schemata more open to logical analysis as it eliminates the finite quandary. Wouldn't primitivism in logic be the system that has whittled down all sense data from the reader's external world to a single, normative interpretation? Accruing variables to supplement finite arc evidence doesn't help when the basic structure is the same. Our mathematical model and pq statement interpretation has further demonstrated the planning fallacy that occurs in closed system circuits of logical positivism. At this point, we understand that the minutiae of sense data are crucial in the accumulation of evidence to advance our case. This has always been so, especially in the domains of grammar.

Curiously enough, this is the first line of battle between Alice and the Mouse in the Pool of Tears. Drawing from her brief experience with the improperness of Wonderland's logic, she surmises that if a Rabbit could talk, so would a Mouse¹¹. Logical positivism dependent on the static fails to consider derivatives that lack domains. Extending logical

¹¹ Moreover, if conversation were to take place, it would naturally begin with the oldest noble language. In her incomprehension, she immediately derives the variables from the Sketch in the form of the *finite* arc segment of the latin grammar. The rules of object identity in Latin grammar fall under six classes: the infinitive, gerund, the dative, the nominative, the accusative and the ablative. If a mouse could talk, it must be a noble creature of some sort and such creatures are often addressed in the oldest language in existence. Surely the mouse could fall under one of these.

positivism techniques in analysis by borrowing and appropriating variables beyond their natural set without regard of the infinite tangential connotations is short sighted and opens up the discourse to the *non- existence* of inferential steps. Consider the Tart trial when the King calls a verdict for a trial that hasn't happened yet:

'Herald the accusation!' Said the King. On this the White Rabbit blew three blasts on the trumpet, and then unrolled the parchment scroll, and read as follows:-

'The Queen of Hearts, she made some tarts

All on a summer day:

The Knave of Hearts, he stole those tarts,

And took them quite away!'

'Consider your verdict,' the King said to the jury

'Not yet, not yet!' the Rabbit harshly interrupted.
'There's a great deal to come before that!'

'Call the first witness,' said the King; and the White Rabbit blew three blasts on the trumpet, and called out, 'First witness!' (Carroll148)

Inferential steps in Wonderland are the witnesses in the Knave's trial. One cannot tell an audience exactly who they are and how they should think without offering short inferential steps towards this proposal.

At this point, Alice has discovered that the Mouse, in all the absurdity that surrounds her, does not merely speak, but

doesn't speak Latin or French and is perfectly, if not increasingly terrified, of speaking to her in English.

'Would it be of any use, now,' thought Alice, 'to speak to this mouse? Everything is so out of the way down here, that I should think very likely it can talk: at any rate, there's no harm in trying.'.... 'Oh, I beg your pardon!' cried Alice hastily [...] 'I quite forgot you didn't like cats.'

'Not like cats!' cried the Mouse in a shrill, passionate voice. 'Would you like cats, if you were me?' (24)

We see then that Carroll's automatic derivation of the S-system Sketch variable is unnecessary in its amplification. However, the simple state of the Mouse speaking English occludes from the content of what the Mouse says. Alice thinks of language as a collection of sets that describe respective phenomena¹². The Mouse on the other hand works with the essence of language as a fluid metaphysical interpretation of phenomena of how Alice would feel if *she* were a Mouse¹³. Once again, we see the Paradox in effect in which the application of a single universal set i.e the Euclidian notion of the whole n domain of the ordinary language set being greater than the hybridised pseudo part and being erroneous whilst interpreted to fit the F-System logic schema. One can only truly appreciate the whole when it is unsegmented into the formalist arcs.

Alice has to achieve a meta-mathematical outlook to model the perceptions of the Sketch and its application in Wonderland. There are no domains in metaphorical

¹² If the Mouse can talk, these are the language sets it would use.

¹³ The Mouse is philosophizing and entering the Sketch microcosm of language as a descriptive force for their situation.

interpretations nor are there singular sets. The Whole is a constantly oscillating perception of analysis from surface and psychological propositions. In Wonderland, Alice and Carroll must come to terms with the fact that actuality is not absolute or static as presented by F Systems in Logic. States are not dichotomised into *is* and *is not*. There are *could be's* and *should be's* and *perhaps* and *just a bit of this* and *not there yet's*. There are infinite shades of possibilities and propositions.

If we approach Wonderland in its relativistic form in an attempt to capture this inferential multiplicity, then we should consider *the science of things*. Though R. Carnap argues that this route shouldn't have us look *behind* the objects and one needs only extrapolate the primitive present (Carnap 35)¹⁴. However, Successful extrapolation of an incidence or an object cannot occur through a one angled analysis. Relativistic comprehension from the Sketch schemata envelopes the whole of it, even the blur Sketch of the unknown background.

The F-System Logic would have us deal with quality; the most polished and analysed explanation to fit the paradigm of actual accepted sense. But what, as the Duck asks the Mouse, 'is *it?*' (Carroll 28). *It* in Logical positivism is the boundless entity sacrificed to the might of the all- pervading sense of the redacted whole. The Formal system has always been keen on *quality* rather than *quantity*. The Sketch, with its multiplicities, is more concerned with the quantities of

¹⁴ Carnap's understanding of the mode of representation falls either under the linguistic description of ordinary language or the metaphoric Russellian. Eg, The man's face is red: ordinary language gives a direct equivalent, the man's face is red because of paint. Russellian language would elevate this into the metaphoric; the man's face is red because he's angry or out of breath etc.

meaning in words and the convergence patterns that lead to towards deeper understandings (Wittgenstein 94). By quantities we don't mean the nature of basic plurals but if one were to dig further into that, we would no doubt find some strain that leads to our present argument; this is relativistic talk, after all. By quantity we mean extending our parameters of perception beyond the ideal F-System logic.

Were Alice a Mouse, would not talk of cats and dogs terrify her? Wouldn't inane talk of any sort bore her if it did not have a specific point? Carroll was somewhat attentive to wordplay in such cases. There was an art to the Caucus Race and the Mouse's antics. The dry wit employed more than actual bore, it hinted at the superfluous mathematical propositions of his time, meaningless strings that even the Mouse, the Duck and Alice didn't understand.

'Speak English!' said the Eaglet. 'I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and, what's more, I do not believe you do either!' (Carroll 30)

The Mouse and Dodo, in reciting the lineage of popes and crusaders and calling for adjournments from the former's audience are an isomorphic symbolic representation of mathematical minds such as William Hamilton and Jean Poncelet. Their innovative mathematical models operated on the fundamental recognition and compliance with the Sketch and the S-system of thought, ie, the myriad possibilities and discoveries that mathematics and its potential of study for the future generations. Jean Poncelet's projective geometry fundamentals could be applied to the situation of the 'primitiveness' of the Sketch schemata. Projective geometry is based on non- Euclidean mathematical laws and models that do not conform to the Universe and the state of

being (actuality) as a two-plane finite symmetrical projection. There is no 'one' geometry in Poncelet's projection, but a multitude of them, ever progressing and projecting with man's infinite imagination. Wordplay in Wonderland worked within similar tangents of grammatical projection: The Mouse's dry wit was both an intentional observation of his communication style and the unlikely possibility that it would dry off the soaked audience, Alice's shifting stature likened to a telescope, the possibility of literally drowning in her own sorrow. While it meant to mock and discredit nineteenth century mathematical progress through its slight at the apparent 'lack of sense' in the whimsical conversations it also failed to consider that mathematical abstraction did not mean 'the lack of sense'.

On Tea Parties, Times tables and Time: The Law of 10 in Quarternion Continuity and Projective Geometry in Wonderland

So, if the S-system Sketch on the proposed mathematical abstraction isn't nonsense, then what is it? In the classical system of Euclidean formal Logic, knowledge and the accumulation of knowledge adheres to the straight-line sets of the linear Ω Universe. Everything that is ever known or *will* be known is filtered down to an absolute finite axiom that offers a singular explanation for a phenomenon. Empiricists and Formal system rationalists are naturally distrustful of abstract systems. Human figures don't outgrow houses and their legs certainly don't stick outside of chimney tops. Cats, magical or otherwise don't vanish in bits and pieces and leave mad grins on branches. They either vanish *in their entirety* or not at all. Madness is an altogether established

form and since integration of variables would result in paradoxes and *Undefined* terms, Carroll's F-system proposition is a single instant point that irrefutably denies sense of insensible absurdist structures pre- and post-reconstruction. This axiom is the sole determinant of the classical Logic system¹⁵.

The F-System is leery of those unknown, grey areas that attempt to relate to undecipherable, pre-observable, pre analysed entities. This absolution in perceptions is introduced in Wonderland's Tweedledee and Tweedledum who offer Alice a series of observable relations that are either absolutely for or absolutely for not.

'I know what you're thinking about' said Tweedledum: 'but it isn't so, nohow'

'Contrariwise,' continued Tweedledee, 'if it was so, it might be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic.' (Carroll 248).

The author so believes in this static on/off steps of inferential knowledge that when Alice introduces the *third option*, a precursor to a continuum in the system, it ends with the trio dancing to the jig ' Around the Mulberry bush'. The F-system presents the puzzling logic behind the addition of the +1 variable that violates the two-plane system of the Euclidean system as a descent into absurdity. When Alice joins the system, it is not seen as a progression but interference and a disruption that violates the natural and nothing gets done. The jig ends up with Alice getting nowhere in her quest for

¹⁵ See Appendix C

substantial direction. The net sum of all this activity beyond the Euclidean system is zero.

The S-system proposes instead a *simultaneous continuum* of meaning and inference that does not rely wholly on past referents as the Formal system does. Thus, the two-plane system of referents from the linear Euclidean system is not used. We introduce the abstract as a semantically grammatical continuum and apply this to Alice in her meeting with Tweedledum and Tweedledee. Having gotten *nowhere* by adding the +1 variant of non-Euclidean postulates, Alice is no longer just symbolic in pro-Euclidean Carroll postulates but is also now a representative of the +1 absurdist Sketch S-system theorem. She has upset the balance between the two plane linear systems and has become a *nobody*. She is a *simultaneous continuum* entity in the F-system, where the surface reality is the logical positivist, but her inference is now from the Sketch, though she still formally uses the traditional referent from the F-system. When they encounter the King sleeping in the grass, they take turns guessing the contents of his dream.

'He's dreaming now,' said Tweedledee: 'and what do you think he is dreaming about?'

Alice said 'Nobody can guess that'

'Why, what about *you!*' Tweedledee exclaimed, clapping his hands triumphantly. 'And if he left off dreaming about you, where do you suppose you'd be? [...] You'd be nowhere [...] You're only a sort of thing in his dream' (Carroll 261).

Alice, a *nobody*, becomes a *who*, a humorous personification that occurs in grammar beyond logical

positivism as a form of identity. Her talk, Tweedledum assures her, cannot wake the king. She's not real. As a non-existing non- Euclidean identity, she can only inhabit the 'actual' space if her identity was contested. However, in the S-system theorem of non- Euclidean space, her grammatical existence is very much apparent. The paradox lies that as a 'sort of thing' in the King's dream, she both exists and doesn't on both sets of theorems. Subsequently, if her existence is the basic variant in both the F-system and Sketch S-system (N+1), then the F-system theorem must concede to the grammar postulate further derived from this observation. Hence as both Tweedes remark, it's a case of 'Ditto' (Carroll 260).

This heuristic in Universal set theory is something that Carroll seems to unconsciously observe early on in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*. Naturally, the first book is very much about proving the innate nature of *static logic*. Such observations are beyond the *common senses* of surface F-system inferential steps. As Alice holds the banner for absolute logical positivism in the first book, the Sketch's S-system bleed through comes in the form of the Cheshire Cat, a character who is not altogether there and yet simultaneously exists within Alice's and by extension, the Logic's perception space. The theory postulated in this F-system argument is projection in which Jean Poncelet presented the linear Euclidean Plane that contained the single universal set Ω as too finite (Buetelspacher 36). He proposed that there were derivatives from this set, subsets within subsets that contained not *universal values* but singular values that infinitely led to some as yet unknown single 1 value. So, the formalistic Euclidean Universal Ω was just one of many, a ' Ω ' of an infinite number of Ω sets.

Bertrand argues in *Philosophy of Logical Atomism* that grammar works in a similar fashion '[there] is no dualism of false or true facts. There are just facts' (9). It all depends good deal on what you mean or rather, where you want to go as Cheshire Cat points out to Alice at the fork in the path. Logical positivism declares that the Ω set of statements and their respective derived meaning is the only one applicable. It says, 'this is the general form of the proposition, this is how things are' (Wittgenstein 32).

We propose that the Sketch's existence points out the futility of the 'finite' by projecting meaning as a single Ω set amongst many. Moreover, since the Sketch is an ever expanding, ever oscillating entity, this axiom dynamic naturally cancels out the possibility that it might fall for the same heuristic held by the F-system theorem. Wittgenstein refers to this as a 'countless trace around the same framework, where a single proposition, unyielding to extra variables, repeats itself again and again' (32). This 'Picture' metaphor is the essence of F-system Logic, a symbol and language that holds us captive and denies us the investigation of the particulates of Sketch atoms. In Wonderland, Alice encounters the fallacy of tracing over the Picture as a means to absolute understanding. She loses her framework F-system stability and this crumbling architecture is reflected in the absurdity Carroll claims in the Projected Geometry theorem. When the caterpillar asks Alice who she is, her reply is that she hardly knows, *at present*. She muses that she was a different person who woke up that morning and she's changed many times since then. When the caterpillar demands that she explain *herself*, he means on the terms of the Ω universal set. Poncelet's theorem, however, means that she is in a constant state of flux and this is reflected in the

language. She's not Ω herself then but a variant, a ' Ω set Alice. She isn't and is herself.

Physically, Alice's shape morph is odd, and nothing is just right. However, Poncelet's theorem as a Sketch S-system variable has merit in that language and grammar becomes a relative device that atomizes the F-System linguistic makeup and lends *new statements* interpretations for consideration beyond the F-system logical positivism. Projection in grammar and language opens up the possibility for a continuum in which new meanings can be deciphered from ordinary or 'absurdist' statements. The caterpillar is a character who understands the Sketch and Poncelet's theorem and subsequently demands are that Alice address her current self, 'Who are you?'. (Carroll 53).

This is on the assumption that Alice understands that matter keeps its integrity through geometric progression of its dimensions. She's understandably angry and remarks that it is *he* not *she* who is in a very unpleasant state of mind. Logical positivism wants us to believe it is a case of illogical statements but Poncelet's theorem and the grammar +1 Sketch variable exposes the situation for what it is. When logic has been nulled by absurdism, keeping temper becomes a matter of not merely being angry and keeping the 'correct proportion' but about breaking free of the F-system framework and acknowledging that 'keeping proportion' cannot statically be represented by language when it exists in a meaning's continuum.

In fact, the caterpillar outright declares that static thought is unnecessary and faulty when Alice recites '*how doth the little busy bee*'. While to her *some* words are altered, the F-system borrowing variants from the Sketch and

presenting the new hybrid system, the caterpillar declares the whole thing wrong (Carroll 60). For the caterpillar, the duality of the ordinary and metaphysical language does not exist. The system is one progressive continuum of interpretation.

These new dimensions Alice would later encounter when her neck stretches to great heights and disturbs the nest of a pigeon who accuses her of not being a little girl but a serpent intent on eating her eggs. As a figure in relative motion, Alice's F-system logic cannot work because she *physically* isn't herself. Her well natured intent to classify herself into a set lands her firmly into the Paradox and further into a new projected dimension. Curious little girls often *stretch* the truth when they are trying to get out of uncomfortable situations.

'But I'm *not* a serpent I tell you!' said Alice. 'I'm a- I'm a-'

'Well, *What* are you!' said the Pigeon. 'I can see you're trying to *invent* something!' (Carroll 65).

This was clearly a barbed remark on the rising mathematical theories and their non-Euclidean forms. Yet what might have been obvious as heresy and absurd to the Sketch unchallenged, the S-system projects a new meaning. On the subject of stretching and grammatical relativism, the F-system framework works as a containment equation where the subject-observer views the world and makes their choices within the framework. In this free-fall quantification, logic deemed absolute is just a first order variation. Wonderlandian logic works *with* relativism and projection, presenting new dimensions of thought and probabilities beyond the linear obvious.

The Duchess's baby is a conundrum to Alice, very clearly raised in a violent household where cooks throw frying pans at its departing mother and the air is thick as smog with pepper and an unruly child slowly but surely morphs into a pig. However, in the context of the kitchen and a child's precocious nature, children *are* known to turn into perfectly horrid pigs that squeal and grunt and are otherwise the very epitome of the imperfect child model. A case for continuum into grammatical absurdity is present. Consider the Queen of Heart's Crown affair where she demands the heads of the gardener- soldiers who have been unfortunate enough to draw her attention. Alice assures them that they will not be beheaded and stuffs them in a flowerpot. The metaphysical units in language predicate their existence as *hidden* but the soldiers are not just hidden. Language and its projection on the proxy of existence create a structure of thought where the *heads* and bodies are not just hidden, but they have essentially disappeared from the executioners' perceptions. In true form, *their heads are gone*, and the soldiers have more or less obeyed their orders, if not to the literal letter.

So, the Sketch validates the situation through grammar and in turn, the proposed theorem validates itself as a predicate proposition in the face of formalistic ridicule. The real nature of things in relativism and projection is not as static as logical positivism would have us think. One can't deny this, as Poncelet's Projection geometry states that amongst the infinite subsets of *things* and *events*, the subset existence of the logical positivism exists. This case and set scenario of atomization and projection is first introduced when Alice refers to mathematical *other* dimensions in her Base Ten times table where her initial dip into the sketch –System is a subtle introduction to the absurdity of non- logical, un-clarified system of the Sketch. While the F-system times table is fairly

direct and leads to *actual conclusions*, the Sketch times table that Alice uses is irregular in that that it has extra variables that overwhelm her intended time trajectory. In the world of rabbits in Waistcoats and grinning Cheshire Cats who are not altogether there, the variable of incompleteness and infinity is not only complex and absurd but it is a self- inferring model that works beyond the linear vectors of its F-system counterpart. Working within new dimensions, one can either opt to 'shut up like a telescope' or expand beyond the comfortable boundaries and re-orientate a new perspective.

Linear logical positivism states that life is no 'great puzzle' (Carroll 18) and four times five is 20. However, in the diametrical non- Euclidean space of Cartesian points and rotary flux dimensions, we encounter propositions that are not simply a case of lessons carrying on into the indeterminable ninth day in the Mock Turtle's school. They are the relative fork in the path where the Cheshire Cat sits grinning on the bough tree. Quaternion linguistic structures are not all about *where* you'll end up as definite scalable elements but on a *when*. Quaternion geometry states that for every constant direction, there are points that share plugs of dimensionality with the imaginary quantities¹⁶.

For Alice traversing the terrain on a temporal ever projecting state of existence according to Wonderlandian logic, our Cartesian plane offers one hypothesis of Euclidean

¹⁶ See Appendix D. Carroll's vexation with this type of mathematics was its irregular response to the linearity of the classical Euclidean system. With the quaternion model, the linearity of classical, clarified mathematics was in danger of being corrupted. The model postulated to chart *time's passage*. While one could observe Time's presence in the scalable units of days, weeks and years, how was it possible to reduce it to a single unit *without an instant* and craft a predicate variable equation from a system in relative motion?

argument. Alice is lost and she does not know which way to go. The Cheshire Cat advises that either path should lead to *somewhere*. As a keen experimentalist, the Cheshire Cat may be Carroll's scientific intrigue overruling his rationalised and clarified Euclidean stance¹⁷.

Subsequently Alice's realization to these intrigues comes in the form of a non-linear path in her lost wanders in Wonderland. Here, 4×5 is linearly 20 but in 4+ dimension space, the linear base systems make way for other Sketch system logic bases. Basic atomization of linear structures expose them to the absurdist nature of quaternion models Here, $4 \times 5 = 12$ which according to Base 18 we have one grouping of 18 units and 2 extra ones. On this trajectory, it would take a while to get to twenty through linear means, as abstract as commutative mathematics are, *she would still get there*. So, the Cheshire Cat was right: 'It doesn't matter which way you go' (Carroll 80). On this system of Sketch continuum, madness becomes a *relative* term applicable only to those entities that exist sorely within the formal F-system axiom. It would be madness for an entity like Alice to step beyond the classical framework and genuinely engage a character so enmeshed in the Sketch such as Cheshire Cat and fail to engage his views into her own domain specific hybrid, which would be the next inferential step towards probable amalgamation.

¹⁷ Experiments and mathematical models are not crafted overnight. They are the products of extensive trial and error propositions that are cumulatively refined over time. An instantaneous existence very rarely occurs in quaternion mathematics. Instants are pinned flashpoints of old data and to interpret them as progressive ideas in mathematics when they deny relativistic clauses is to deny an ever expanding universe that is *diametrically* and not just *linearly* complex.

From this postulation, Cheshire's observation of them being all 'mad' (82) is valid. Linear properties that deny the shift and stretch of innovation from the Sketch come to very odd surface referential conclusions. Dogs and cats wag tails and growl in diametrical constancies, criss-crossing variables that exist in tandem to their true natures. Cats wag tails when they are mad and dogs when happy. Consequently, growling and purring follow the same trajectory and babies become literal pigs without metaphoric explanations. In this realm of quaternion continuum uncertainties, can a word really mean what it says it means? Can statements exist in that instant-flash of a pocket space in the 4th- dimensional axiom and accurately incorporate the perfect meaning for a moment however fleeting?

This is the question posed by the March Hare to Alice when he admonishes her that saying 'say what she means' (88) and avoid riddles. Alice, working within the formal framework understands that riddles exist as logical teases that have their inevitable ends in completely feasible and sensible outcomes. This linearity in issues vexes the March Hare who works within a constant continuum of linguistic and experiential structures and understands that though there are multiple subsets of meaning, meaning is not static nor does it have one dimension of representation. Riddles exist but that is *not all that they are*. The Tea Party was meant to satirise the addition of Time as a probable vector in quaternion mathematics. Hamilton declared that Time could exist as more than a metaphor in his new equation because its dimension could be graphed with imaginary numbers i, j and k . This absurd representation flew in the face of all that Euclidean mathematics stood for; a rotation around a vast ever expanding plane in which entities could make *forward*

progress by twirling around designated spots because they had imaginary clause numbers tied in with Time.

Time amongst the continuum mad agents of Wonderland is not an '*it*' but a *him*. It is this personification of temporal passage that adds the necessary new dimension in the continuum of language. As a non- mad agent, Alice stops in linear logic of the F-system and can only see Time as being wasted. Time is a nebulous mass of action of cause and effect. She has to '*...beat time when [she learns] music*' (Carroll 86). Time does not exist as a separate entity as it does for the Mad Hatter and the March Hare. For them, Time is an independent clause whose nature has gone into such a continuum transition that *it* might as well be a *him* and 'he won't stand beating' (91). As such, offending him is a credible crime and this is what Hatter does. What is seen as time wasting in the F-system framework is read as murderous intent in the quaternion S-system.

'Well, I'd hardly finished the first verse,' said the Hatter, 'when the Queen jumped up and bawled out, "He's murdering the time! Off with his head!"' (Carroll 92).

So, while the initial motive was satirising quaternion mathematics, quaternion continuum in language use interpreted the Tea Party as a *forward progressive* entity regardless of no visible distance covered¹⁸.

'Really, now you ask me...I don't think-

¹⁸ Static surface life perception in F-system logic does not translate as absolutism in Wonderlandian S-system logic. Having *more* of something isn't always based on a composite materialistic concept of actually *having*.

'Then you shouldn't talk', said the Hatter (97)

The subject projects an 'is existing', 'has existed' and 'will exist' states that alter the logic within the true nature of things. The F-system framework would have the world operate in the finite equations of logical positivism and absolutism, but the S-system theorem draws on the muchness of the Sketch. In this muchness, sisters can make a home out of living out of a treacle tart well and *draw* treacle. In the continuum 4+ dimensional thought of the Sketch S-system, draw exists beyond the obvious surface interpretation of immediate context. It will exist (has in some pocket of arcing instant time) as the colloquial 'draw' of getting water from the well. Yet the muchness of drawing treacle out of the treacle well, an absurdity to the logic of the F-system theorem, *draws* on other meanings as well. They are the infinite sub-subsets of quaternion dimension manipulation and language projection. In this atomized realm of language, the sisters draw more than treacle in the literal and colloquial sense. They draw inspiration from experiential continuum thought; words that begin with the letter 'M' such as moon and memory (Carroll 97).

This S-system schema exists in the Mock Turtle's story as well where the Tortoise is projected as a Turtle teacher for young turtles. In F-system Logic, turtles are turtles and tortoises are tortoises. Logic states that there can never be one *inbetween* and logic should progress in a very definite manner. However, in language S-system continuums, tortoises do become turtles in insta-simultaneous Times. The turtle was a tortoise because his atomized *complex* self was a teacher.

'Why did you call him Tortoise, if he wasn't one?' Alice asked

'We called him Tortoise because he taught us' said the Mock Turtle angrily. 'Really you are very dull!' (Carroll 125)

Indeed, constant referential from the F system way of thought can make for a very dull Alice experiential existence. While Carroll would like to point out the nonsensical, absurd progressions of abstract thought that lead to dead ends, the S-system ensures that language's uninhibited inference into ever arcing subscripts makes for new interpretations. The turtle can become a tortoise because he '*taught us*'. Loosen your tongue and '*taught us*' becomes *tortoise*. The S-system operates on the existence of the +1 variable beyond the N norm. Thus, though Alice's school had French and Music, the Mock Turtle's has the extra *washing*. There are courses in Reeling and Writhing, Ambition, Distratification, Uglification and Derision, all branches in Arithmetic Mystery..ancient and modern Seaography: then Drawling once a week with the old conger-eel alongside Stretching and Fainting in Coils (127, 128 Carroll). As non-dull thinkers, we derive Reeling and Writhing to be Reading and Writing, Mystery as History, ancient and modern; and Seaography as Geography¹⁹. Drawling, Stretching and Fainting in Coils; Drawing, Sketching and Painting in Oils, essential academic basics for all young boys and girls and now turtles and tortoises and everything in between.

The Gryphon explains that lessons are not static situations. They are *less on* each day. The Russell paradox pops up once again. Lesson in abstract mathematics systematically culled the logical structure from sensible

¹⁹ Because what turtle is worth his salt if he doesn't know the seography of the sea

theorems, *lessening* the integrity of the science. While it was a clever pun, planning it in the Mock Turtle context and borrowing variables to fit a certain domain²⁰, language continuity cannot exist in this static logical point. The Mock Turtle environment does exist in some pocket in Time comprehension and though the static logical positivism seeks to derive meaning from it to point out some absurdity, it does not take away from the 'Ω Mock Turtle set theorem's existence.

Conclusion

Though Lewis Carroll set out to definitively disprove Projective Geometry and Quaternion emergent mathematics, much like the ancients, the final system had met its end in an age of progress. Euclidean axiomatic properties could not inhibit the linguistic constructions that made up *Alice in Wonderland* and *Through the Looking Glass*. Postulating that language ran in equal closed system parallels similar to the Euclidean geometries was an error in the presence of not only language intensionality and cartographic interpretation but the denial that there were an infinite geometries and though they sprung from a common source, the point of origin was not deterministic of their eventual conclusion.

Intentional or not, Carroll not only validated the existence of the new theories but set a course for all emergent language and mathematical philosophers to investigate the constraints of meaning and the limitations older models of thought had on them. A theory was not subject to 'being the

²⁰ That lessons were *not* lessons when they lessened each day and taught you nothing and at worse, nonsense absurdity

right colour' (Carroll 216) to be accepted. Progress would only be possible in a hospitable environment where rigid bodies acknowledged those penetrating forces from Wonderland and saw them as more than stuff and nonsense. People didn't lose their heads on a whim; verdicts were not passed before all conclusive evidence was presented and you most certainly didn't get a verdict before either. Only a bed of strife could foster the initiative and to quote Tiger-Lily 'in most gardens [if] they make the beds too soft-[...]the flowers are always asleep' (Carroll 218).

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Appendix A

In Functions, we shall base our two systems as composite *almost equals* to factor Carroll's attempt at integration and to represent the finite nature of the F-System Logic schemata. We shall represent our S-system as $f[x(N+1)]$ as function $f(x)$ in the set of the original S-system logic schemata of the Sketch. Russell's Paradox describes the irregularities experienced by individuals who try to create Absolute Sets from the opposing theorems to fit a prevailing, predetermined course of Logic (Russell 78). These hybrid-sets become paradoxes when their own finite limitations on Logic for a particular set *encompass* divergent traits to satisfy a particular property. Finite Sets exist purely to represent particular schemata in a homogenous representation. When different variables are added to satisfy a 'dominant' theory or theories, a contradiction arises in the statement due to the unrestricted comprehension in reading them. Hybrid sets do not completely lend themselves to logical positivist reading. From this, we derive the automatic from Alice's Pool of Tears experimentations into the absurd Sketch as representations of Alice's amalgamation of the insensible Wonderlandian Logic into the traditional convention of Formal Logic.

As it stands, $F(N) > S(N+1)$ where the Formal system alludes superiority over the Sketch. As a function, we represent the Sketch as $S(N+1) = f[x(N+1)]$ keeping in mind our Euclidian and later, non- Euclidian representation of the multitude of dimensionality available in the S-system (N+1) schemata. We use the lower class (f) in the limitation function $f(x)(N+1)$ to represent the set theory that will extend our own position in the paper. It is a democratic argument, as the Formal Logic system will in turn be represented by the set $F(x) N$. In


Wonderlandian Logic, what happens when one tries to paint white roses red? Are they still white? Will they now be red?

Appendix B

Naturally, this avenue further presents the possibility of relativism but first, our paradox:

$$f[x(N+1)] > n > F[x(N)] < [F(x)(N) + 1]$$

The function representation of the Sketch ($f[x(N+1)]$) is always greater than the finite representation in the domain (n) which in turn will be greater than the static, linear F-System $F[x(N)]$ representation whose function will then be less than the function that is an amalgam to the original F-System schemata $F(x)(N) + 1$. Reading it backwards shows us that the amalgam is greater than its initial overarching set, a situation that should be the exact opposite if we are trying to authenticate the F-System's superiority over any 'contaminated' strain of logic. Further on, we see that beyond the domain (n), the Formal System falls short of the Sketch in terms of the conceptual landscape. This ought not to occur and it further advances our own argument on the shortcomings of Formal or Formal amalgamated logic Beta systems towards representing an absolute sense data of experiential perception.



This Beta version of the $F[x(N+1)]$ system that attempts to frame the Sketch qualities and represent them in Formal system dynamics are a failed derivative. The arc of exploration and analysis is finite, and closed systems rarely, if ever, offer the preferred schemata towards exploring the infinite possibilities. The domains preclude the assumption that the 'wild' Wonderlandian Logic is primitive, ie, lacking in the necessary prerequisites needed for logical analytic

deconstruction. The primitive is logically inferior, and the reader's mind arrives to it through a furtive surface analysis, what Bertrand Russell calls the psychology of primitivism (Russell 76). The eternal world is composed of objects which are processed in our minds as sense data. The primitive is the surface detail, the automatic response and judgement in a situation. The logical is the psychological derivative from various judgements that *a/ways* amounts to a singular linear interpretation of logical truth.

Appendix C

The test and absolution towards empiricist thought has always been an evolutionary trait (Yudkowsky 24). Knowledge was a communal asset and as such inferential steps towards refining and developing it further were always no more than one step beyond complete understanding. One could not propose an (N+Z) axiom interpretation when no one understood what an (N+B) proposition was. From this progression, all axioms and potential theories were linearly static and obviously finite.

Hence we go back to our pq theorem and propose that Carroll's naïve linear objective reality blinds him to the inference of the quantum- entanglement process that makes up grammatical sets and subsets in the abstract and its application and understanding in brain- reader- expression circumstances. In quantum grammar, we refer to Bertrand Russell's theory that language was atomistic Basic classical materialistic has always relied heavily on past reference and basing tentative new potential probabilities on *immediate* extrapolations from the previous statements or theorems. - - (2) p(+) - - (2) q (=) 4, AB = BC because BC = AB because the processing of experiential matter happens in conventional natural 'bits' or measured instants. This can be found in our number systems and our base systems. We often favour the 'pairs of two' process (2, 4, 6, 8 etc) because we scale down an unfathomable scale into a unit that is either for or not (the F System vs the S-System, Classical London vs Wonderland, Linear Euclidean vs Diametrical expostulates from Non Euclidean systems).

The switch is either on or off and in such systems the particulates of its makeup are domain specific.

Appendix D

Existence in Quaternion geometry is represented in the following equation: $Q = w + ix + jy + kz$. The quaternions of real qualities positive, negative and null are w , x , y and z . the imaginary quantities attached (i , j and k) help orientate a model beyond the linearity of three- dimensional space. While they cannot be logically quantified in the singular linear reality of the F-system framework, the Sketch nevertheless exerts its presence through computational and combinatorial mathematics via 'imaginary' plot models.

