TINABANTU

Journal of African National Affairs



Vol.2 No.2
August 2006

TINABANTU

Journal of African National Affairs

Vol. 2. No. 2. 2006

Journal Subscription Rates

2 issues per year
Africa, Asia, South America, The West Indies:
£12 or US$20 / 2 issues
R120,00 / 2 issues

Other areas:
£15 or US$25 / 2 issues

Single Copies
Africa, Asia, South America, The West Indies:
£6 or US$10 / 1 issue
R60,00 / 1 issue

Other areas:
£8 or US$12,50 / 1 issue

Prices include postage

Order from:
The Editor (Sales)
TINABANTU
P.O. Box 359
Rondebosch, 7701
Cape Town, South Africa
E-mail: casas@casas.co.za
Fax no. +27-21-685-0332

The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS)

The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS)
P.O. Box 359
Rondebosch
Cape Town
7701 South Africa

First Published 2006

ISBN No. 1-919932-44-5

The Editor does not necessarily share or support the views of the various authors.

Typeset by CASAS

Printed and bound by SED Printing Solutions, Cape Town, South Africa (021) 951 2000

CONTENTS

Volume 2. Number 2. 2006

African Identity and the Resolution of the "Native Problem" in South Africa

Sipho Seepe

A few years ago, I was intrigued by my university colleague's frantic attempts to learn French. Upon inquiry he indicated that he was going to France for two weeks. "Just for two weeks!" I exclaimed after being unable to suppress my disbelief. Yet it made sense – in France the French were not going to be at his service. This much we knew. Despite having spent all his youth and adult life in South Africa, the need for him to learn an African language had not dawned upon him.

The fact is that in a country such as South Africa, white South Africans are more likely to learn European languages than the African languages spoken by the majority of people who reside in the same country. This disregard and lack of interest in the languages of fellow compatriots is one of the defining characteristics of many white South Africans for whom blacks do not exist except to be at their beck and call. Despite occupying the same national space, they exist as if they are worlds apart - in another place and time. In this case, the French mattered – Africans did not. This remains the case for most white South Africans today.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu jokingly expressed similar sentiments when he remarked that his embrace of the master's religion, his exposure to the best of British university education, and winning a Nobel Peace prize did not grant him rights equal to that of a useless white bum in the park. After all, to the apartheid regime he was non-white and non-European.

The labels 'non-white' and 'non-European' were deliberately meant to drive two points home: one, that being black is an aberration from the norm, which is white; and two, by the extent of this logic, blacks had to disabuse themselves of the notion of any equality with whites. Under these fraught circumstances, should we therefore be surprised that the assertion of an African identity has become a post 1994 political, cultural and social national imperative?

This assertion and the attendant cultural reclamation should be seen as a corrective step following centuries of denigration, dehumanisation and oppression. As Tim Brennan puts it so eloquently in his essay "The National Longing for Form", anti-colonial nationalism has as its task "reclaiming community from within boundaries defined by the very power whose presence denied community." [1]

Es'kia Mphahlele captures this as follows:

> I cannot help but appreciate and support the concept of Black Consciousness in South Africa. How else? We have been shut up in an enclave for three hundred years so that we never forget that we are black, so what is so startling or scary when we make it known that blackness has become our anchor, our source of strength, the reason for our survival?[2]

It is this experience that makes President Mbeki's bold, ambiguous and unapologetic assertion "I am an African", (echoing the words and sentiments of earlier impulses towards a black and African identity) so profound. This bold assertion of African identity is part of the healing process following centuries of denigration. Such a bold assertion is unlikely to endear us to those who had declared themselves our perpetual masters.

It can also be understood, as Frantz Fanon articulates in *The Wretched of the Earth,* as recognition of an identity that goes beyond the mere space of the nation state and evokes a continental consciousness that also resonates with African diasporic identities. To this extent, it is a response at the level of ideas to apartheid identifications. As Fanon explains: "The native intellectual who decides to give battle to colonial lies fights on the field of the whole continent. The past is given back its value.... The native intellectual who has gone beyond the domains of Western culture and who has got it into his head to proclaim the existence of another culture never does so in the name of Angola or of Dahomey. The culture which is affirmed is African culture."[3]

This affirmation of African cultural and political identity has led to accusations of reverse racism among white South Africans who refuse to accept change that originates from black minds. In some cases, they have staked their claims to be called African. In other cases, they have looked to Europe and America and argued that globalization has given rise to global identities and that a new nation state, other than as a mere site of citizenship, is practically dead upon arrival and doomed to failure with its African nationalist project. Afro-pessimism has prevailed on the part of many whites, who refuse to believe that blacks can lead.

There are also those who see the assertion of an African identity as a return to the past, prior to their 'civilising' of the natives. Theirs is a fear of the return of the repressed. Their fantasy is that of the mob, the black mass – the "swart gevaar" as they labelled black resistance under apartheid. Seldom do they recognize that the former colonized have long been modernized and have an array of identities more sophisticated / complex and theorized than some of them could care to imagine. Referring to this challenge Steve Biko wrote: "So immersed are [whites] in prejudice that they do not believe that blacks can formulate their thoughts without white guidance or trusteeship." [4]

While some of them may have genuine grievances and real feelings of alienation that they are being discarded in the South African reconstruction processes despite the skills they can bring, it is also understandable that Mbeki, in his role as President is easily irritated by what some may consider mild expressions of racism. If anything, tolerance of such remarks is indicative of failure by sections of the white South Africans to reciprocate the reconciliatory spirit displayed by Africans. For black people, no racial incident, racial remark or expression in behaviour is remote, isolated, mild or inconsequential. They are experienced as part of the cumulative experience of racial bigotry and injustice.

In the broad scheme of things, this assertion of an African identity is part of the process to resolve a native problem created by apartheid colonialism. To the extent that the oppressed are their own liberators, it is incumbent upon the natives to resolve this problem – a challenge of turning around a state of alienation and self-loathing and to turn their identity into a positive force. For Mphahlele, Mbeki and Malegaparu

Makgoba, the African identity project is about reclaiming the right for Africans to name themselves. It is about taking ownership of the native question. Gone are the days when Africans have to carry labels imposed on them. Prospects of non-racialism and the configuring of new identities are predicated upon the resolution of this native question. It is possible to reconfigure new identities simultaneously as we resolve this historic challenge. For those of us who have never doubted our Africanness, these debates are meaningless. They are a diversion from critical issues such as poverty, diseases, homelessness, landlessness, unemployment, illiteracy etc., all of which impact heavily on the African majority.

The sudden vociferous interest and appropriation of the African identity by whites is understandably considered to be nothing short of a deliberate obfuscation and mystification aimed at derailing Africans from dealing with white privilege and all its manifestations. Not surprisingly, the ANC and other liberation movements are unwavering in declaring that "first and foremost the struggle and challenge remain that of the liberation of blacks in general and Africans in particular. Secondly, the ANC's own argument states that it is the struggle to create a non-racial, non-sexist, democratic and united South Africa. Thirdly, it is the quest for a single united South African nation with a common overriding identity. Fourthly, it is about resolving the antagonistic contradictions between black and white. And, fifthly, it is about combating tribalism, racialism or any other form of ethnic chauvinism."

This definition of an African or black does not include whites and the new identities that such liberation may result in cannot be based on white privilege, nor can it lead to identities that come out of negotiation or dialogue between white and black. Additionally, it does not suggest an elitist exercise of engagement between white privilege and black suffering. The commonalities in this attempt at definition, are defined through being black (read: black experience); and whites would have to fit into this reality of natives taking centre-stage at this defining phase and resolving the native question.

What then of the future?

In a profound sense, the process of identity definition and formation is linked to the inauguration of a new cultural, political and human consciousness. The construction of this identity becomes therefore an act of liberation. For Gessler Nkondo, this shift should "institute a practice that would break with the familiar, the now routine way of seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding things, so that the new organism become receptive to the potential forms of a non-aggressive, non-exploitative society" [5]

This involves the field of culture with expressive practice becoming "the means towards both individual self-fashioning and communal liberation."[6] Consistent with the above, freedom should provide us with the space to name ourselves as we see fit. Within the umbrella of 'African' a range of identities then becomes possible rather than a simple acceptance or adoption of one. Identity preferences range (singly or in combination) from black, male, female, Zulu, Indian, white, Christian, Muslim, heterosexual, gay, scholar, poet, writer, Marxist, capitalist, etc.

The assertion of different identities is a rejection of attempts to impose a new official identity and is an embrace of identities that are true to the individual self as they are to collective affiliations and identifications. It is about biological reality and symbolic life and the different roles people play depending on a range of factors, including location, geography, positionality in the economy. [7] These are also identities literally in motion as one person may move from one physical space to another, from a place of birth to a place of work, from a rural to an urban terrain. Their co-existence, without one excluding the other, may lead to less separation (of selves) and to more coalescence, a greater sense of community and revealing deeper truths. A sense of the 'coming out' of a totality of identities even within a single individual can fulfil the desire for affirmation and serve to nurture a new homogeneous identity and armed with it, a

new set of principles (read: ethics). The resultant new South African identity would be informed by the objective realities inasmuch as it would be an identity that is being imagined or constructed.

At societal level the question arises: what is distinctive about being South African? After all, national identity can be a socialising and mobilising instrument for social, economic and political ends. If this assertion leads to real and sustained social and economic benefits for the poor and the marginalised, then it would be worth the effort. But one must guard against the assertion of national identity as an alibi for an incipient authoritarianism or to benefit only an elite yet acting supposedly in the name of the people (whom they claim to represent).

At the same time, the dangers of a narrow nationalism where politicians and the ruling party are the sole scribes of a national discourse and its political character must be pointed out. The terrain of the nation ought to be maintained as a site for improving the material circumstances of those who reside in it and abide by its rules.

When the national space is seen from the outset through an international outlook, that emphasises the solidarity between one people's struggles and another, when notions of development and underdevelopment are fully understood as not only a South African phenomenon, but a microcosm of the divisions of labour and the distribution of wealth in the world, there is greater possibility for progressive change.

When the South African people remember and can recall not only their own trials and tribulations, but those of their neighbours and the rest of the continent, only then can they develop a shared purpose and pursue a common future. Their memory should extend to liberation and post liberation efforts in other African countries. They need to learn from history and not see themselves as unique or approach the transition without the full knowledge of what has happened in the rest of Africa at their disposal. The assertion of being undeniably African is simply the start of this process.

This is the African identity that should shape and inform our domestic and foreign policies. An awareness that the objective realities are shaped by history as well as present day challenges of underdevelopment. In this way, being African – an African identity in action - becomes a space and time that is not constrained by nationhood, but suggests collective vantage points all over the African continent and even in the African Diaspora - linking cultural and social identity to political action of improving the lot of Africans, of being black in the world. It becomes as Fanon suggests, "a global responsibility":

"Far from keeping aloof from other nations, therefore, it is national liberation which leads the nation to play its part on the stage of history. It is at the heart of national consciousness that international consciousness lives and grows. And this two-fold emerging is ultimately the source of all culture." [8] This allows not only for solidarity, but shared suffering and collective victories. For the intellectual it means, as Edward Said has stated, that the task at hand is to universalise the crisis.[9]

The second aspect of this identity relates to commitments that a country enters with itself as it creates a different if not new society. This calls for an appreciation of how identities intersect and a celebration of cultural and ethnic diversity, while allowing the African majority the right to address the historical injustice. All these mean that African identity cannot be reified. It is dependent on change and the ongoing and varied responses of people to their material circumstances at different times.

In this changing reality, an understanding of time itself is freed from repression and oppression of the past (i.e. a mere association of one's identity with the past), and a real possibility exists of something new, which therefore constitutes a rupture. African identity in this way can cause a real break with the past (no longer trapped in the Africa of time past heralding simply past glory or the recalling of the injustices

caused by slavery, colonial plunder and colonial genocide) through allowing for multiple identities and the creative expressions thereof.

A new temporality thus can emerge and new practices, encompassing a new consciousness of what Fanon calls "a new rhythm of life" when "the present is no longer turned in upon itself but spread out for all to see." [10] It is this space that may lead to the construction of a new South African identity. It is through continental identity that the nation is looked at through greater clarity of vision. Aside from providing us with a unifying mission, this identity should enable us to create for ourselves a space that is big enough to tell our own stories.

The emergence of these narratives will initiate us into a world where nothing is deemed static, where neither nation nor people is finalised or finalisable, where the naming and shaping of the social world proceeds apace, seeking to complete the human condition through alleviating the plight of the suffering and offering more sustained solutions to the problems afflicting Africans in the world.[11]

In this way, we return to where we began: that the debate on an African identity is fundamentally an attempt to address the native question. Asserting the very idea of African identity, the notion of an African nation in the making, might well take us beyond current constraints and political expediencies to address the human question.

Notes

1. Tim Brennan. "The National Longing for Form". In Homi K. Bhabha. Nation and Narration. Routledge. London. 1990. p.58.
2. Es'kia Continued. Stainbank and Associates. Johannesburg. 2004.
3. Frantz Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth. Penguin Books. London. 1967. p. 170.
4. Steve Biko. I Write What I Like. Picador Africa Publishers. Johannesburg. 2004.
5. G.M. Nkondo. The African in South Africa in a Time of Reconstruction and Development. (Mimeo) University of Venda, Thohoyandou. 1996.
6. Paul Gilroy. The Black Atlantic. Harvard University Press. Cambridge. 1993 p.40. Uses this expression to refer to the African diasporic people of the Black Atlantic. For drawing attention to this, I am indebted to Neil Lazarus's study, Nationalism and Cultural Practice in the Postcolonial World. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 1999.
7. Julia Kristeva in her essay "Women's Time", has some points which are useful for our purposes although her focus appears to be more on a European reality which limits its usefulness for our purposes. In her analysis of women's identities, she speaks of the "singularity of each person", "the multiplicity of every person's possible identifications" and "the relativity of his/her symbolic as well as biological existence" and the responsibility that results from all these leading social and individual stakes opening the possibility for a new ethic. See, The Kristeva Reader edited by, Toril Moi. Columbia University Press. New York. 1986. pp. 210-211.
8. Frantz Fanon. Op cit. p. 187.
9. Representations of Intellectuals: The 1993 Reith Lectures. Pantheon Books. New York. 1994
10. Frantz Fanon. Op cit. p. 194.
11. Homi Bhabha in his essay "DissemiNation" sees the people as both the historical objects of a national pedagogy, as indeed they are subjects of a process of signification and he speaks of "the living principle of the people as the continual process by which the national life is redeemed and signified as a repeating and reproductive process." In, Homi Bhabha. Ibid. p. 297.

The Manifestation of Nigerian

National Identity through Music

Oluyemi Olaniyan

Introduction

National identity could be defined as unique characteristics by which a person is recognized, as well as being in relationship with the cultural ideals of his/her nation. Such cultural ideals form the basis for people's sense of belonging. The state of being the same in nature and of holding similar beliefs binds people of the same country or state together. Although people of the same nation could be of diverse ethnic groups, certain factors, such as their beliefs and their religious and socio-economic practices, are strong binding forces. Nketia stated that Africa as a continent is not as culturally homogeneous as has generally been assumed.[1] Nigeria, a nation with over 280 languages, could hardly be said to be completely homogeneous. Nevertheless, there are factors within Nigeria's diverse cultural heritage that bind all Nigerians together, as people sharing a common identity. Music is one of the aspects of Nigerian cultural heritage through which people's national identity can manifest itself.

The Act of fostering National Identity in a Multi Ethnic/Tribal Society like Nigeria

When one evaluates the multi-ethnic nature of Nigerians, it could be felt that fostering a sense of national identity may not be an easy task. Normally, no problem will arise if the spirit of ethnic identity could be extended to that of national identity as a means to foster love and unity among the people. The envisaged task has been made easy through a considerable number of social events such as sports and games. Nigerian national identity could also be expressed through people's works of art and in craft such as cloth weaving, dyeing, painting, sculpture, pottery and hair plaiting. Among the prevailing creative arts, music, with its several dimensions, stands out prominently as an art form through which national identity can be expressed. Music encompasses dimensions such as music itself, language proper, dance, drama and visual arts. In this write-up the three categories of music examined are traditional, art and popular. Each of these genres has been found to be dynamic as each evolves with time.

The Expression of National Identity through Traditional Music

In viewing the possibility of expressing national identity through traditional music, one would have to assess the extent to which Nigerian traditional musical practices, and the instrumental resources used, show similarities. Concerning the cultivation of music in Africa, Nketia states that:

> North Africa is inhabited by societies whose languages and cultures are very closely related to those of the Arab world of the Middle East, while the southern portion is dominated by settler populations from Europe.[2]

It should be noted that the situation has now changed in the southernmost part of the area being referred to by Nketia, namely the termination of the apartheid policy of racial segregation practised by the previous white minority regime. Based on Nketia's premise, the areas in Africa that cannot be said to have indigenous African musical cultures are North Africa, northern Sudan, parts of the Maghreb, and the East African littoral. The music of these areas belongs to the oriental family of modal music. Having pointed out this fact, it will be right to state that the rest of Africa consists of societies that have musical cultures which have their roots in the soil of Africa. Apart from this, the musical cultures, according to Nketia, form a network of distinct yet related traditions which overlap in certain aspects of style, practice or usage and share common features of internal patterns, basic procedure and contextual similarities.[3]

Nigeria, as a country in West Africa, consists of societies whose musical cultures are mainly of African origin. This notwithstanding, there are the influences of acculturation and enculturation which give room for instrumental borrowing and the sharing of musical ideas. In fulfillment of the spirit of national identity, Nigerian traditional musicians have been creating music that stands out as Nigerian in nature. Music in this realm reveals aspects of Nigerian cultural heritage as far as vocal style, instrumental organization, performance procedure, contextual implication and general functional value. Structure is bound to be a reflection of the societal concept. An aspect such as the language-delivery style of Nigerian folk songs is indicative of the people's way of life. In a comparative examination regarding folk-songs, texts and folk tales, Lomax states that; "A comparison of the studies carried out to the present analysis of folk song texts suggests that folk song texts yield information about norms more readily than folk tales."[4]

The focus here is on the folk song, not the folk tale. Lomax's opinion, which is supported by many scholars, is that folk song texts serve as culture indicators. In spite of the cultural diversities among the people of Nigeria, there are elements that bind them together as members of the same society. In assessing the varieties in our music, one could also observe the point of unification. Musical instruments might differ in structure; yet all categories of instruments are available within each geographical zone, with a few areas having some elements of uniqueness regarding instrumental resources. Nigerian vocal music likewise shares common features. The people's dances and costuming are unique to Nigeria. All of these factors enable one to identify the people as members of the same cultural entity. It is in recognition of this fact that the first national signature tune was played on the *Iyaalu dundun* (*dundun* being mother/master drum) for radio broadcast. This is a relative representation of the signature tune;

This signature tune was used for many years. Even though the text was in English, it served the purpose of affirming national identity, as it was played on one of the most widespread Nigerian musical instruments - the talking drum - and also used a Nigerian vocal style. More recently, a combination of Nigerian musical instruments was adopted when playing a signature tune to usher in the national news, both on television and radio. All of these are aimed at the expression of Nigerian national identity through traditional music. Furthermore, individuals and groups demonstrate their musical ingenuity in order to express a sense of national identity. Solo performers such as Denge, Kokoro (the blind minstrel) and Dan Maraya Jos have all, at one time or another, performed in and outside the country. Other traditional musicians such as the *dundun* and *bata* music groups, *mpokiti*, *Etilogwu* and *egedege* music and dance groups, and several other traditional music groups across northern and southern Nigeria have all expressed a sense of national identity through their music. Festac '77, despite all the criticism it drew from various quarters, was not without achievement regarding the fostering of a national identity.

The Manifestation of Nigerian National Identity through Art Music

The beginnings of art music can be traced back to about the second half of the nineteenth century. It has been observed that the early Christian missionaries banned the performance of all forms of African music as it was believed that such types of music were not spiritually uplifting, according to Christian standards. Converts were not allowed to sing folk songs or play any indigenous, musical instruments. This attitude inevitably influenced the early educated Christians.

The pioneers of academically trained musicians were A.C. Coker and T.K.E. Phillips, and later Fela Sowande. These pioneers got themselves brain-washed by colonial masters' attitudes towards African music. Anything traditional was linked to paganism. These attitudes suppressed African cultural identity while promoting Western European, cultural tastes. These attitudes eventually led to a sort of awareness when the spirit of nationalism and patriotism developed in the hearts and minds of Nigerians. At this time, cultural integration became inevitable. But it became imperative that Nigerians did not allow their own cultural identity to be swept under the carpet. As Adegbite observed: "When a country integrates cultural traits from abroad, it is usual for such a country to keep its Cultural identity".[5]

Consequently, the efforts of Nigerian art musicians in fusing the nation's cultural identity with a foreign variant was revealed. This practice started with church missionaries indoctrinating privileged Nigerians into the performance of Western music including church hymns for worship. Thereafter English texts were translated into Yoruba, and later into other Nigerian indigenous languages. Such texts were sung to Western tunes, resulting in a distortion of the native language, as in the case of Yoruba. Olaniyan observed that this practice resulted in a complete distortion of Yoruba tonal language.[6] It is very important to note that that fault was not taken seriously until people started becoming more aware of their cultural identity. Furhtermore, Olaniyan states that the spirit of cultural nationalism spread to music art. [7]

Composers of native airs, a category of Nigerian contemporary music art, are: Revd. J.J. Ransome Kuti whose contribution of sacred songs are recorded in the appendix to the Yoruba Hymn Book; A.T. Ola

Olude whose compositions are put together in a book titled *Mayo-kun*, Bola Fadeyi's compositions appear in a book titled *Orin Iyin*; Lufadeju composed songs put together in the book *Imole Okan*; B.G. Oriere's songs appear in *Oniruuru orin fun Igba ati Akoko*; Oluyemi Olaniyan's songs are collected in *Orin Ijosin*; Dayo Dedeke's book titled *Ma Gbagbe Ile* and Ajibola's book *Orin Yoruba* respectively contain both sacred and secular compositions that are widely used. Ola-Olu Omideyi wrote songs as necessitated by occasions, but these have not been compiled in book form. In the eastern part of the country, the book titled *Abu Ekele Na Otuto* written by Harcourt Whyte, stands out as an important contribution in the arena of art music.

Another category of art music through which Nigerian national identity is manifested is the Nigerian national anthem and the composition of various classical forms by the country's academically trained musicians. The composers in question have done much in merging African/Nigerian elements with Western ones in their compositions, all for the purpose of achieving a concept of Nigerian national identity. Fela Sowande is one of the most renowned, academically trained musicians. Initially, he was almost carried away by the brain-washing of pioneers by the Westerners, but he eventually wriggled his way out of that mindset and temptation. At that time, his link with Western music was still strong. Sowande could be described as a cultural nationalist. Concerning Sowande's pioneering effort in art music composition, Bateye states that among the music that feature in Nigerian concert and church music traditions of contemporary times, is that of Fela Sowande. His musical style is still largely the bedrock of the compositional writing of many academically trained, Nigerian composers of the 1990s. [8]

One of Sowande's works that reveals a sense of Nigerian national identity is the Nigerian Folk Symphony, which he was commissioned to compose for Nigeria's Independence Day celebrations on October 1, 1960. The performance of that work has been described as a unique, spectacular event in Nigerian history. One of the themes of this work is a Yoruba melody "Oluwa, ma fi mi se gbagbe" meaning "God, do not forget me".

Many art musicians have demonstrated a sense of Nigerian national identity in their works. Adam Fiberesima's "Jaja of Opobo"; Ayo Bankole's solo songs such as "Iya" and choral works such as "mo fe beji"; Akin Euba's new invention of "African pianism"; Joshua Uzoigwe's "Dance of the Forest"; Sammy Akpabot's "Opu Jaja"; Meki Nzewi's "The Lost Finger"; Okechukwu Ndubuisis's "Vengeance of the Lizards", Laz Ekwueme's choral works; Tunji Vidal's "Danzo Africano" and Yemi Olaniyan's "Awo Dudu" - to mention just a few - are works in which a deep sense of Nigerian national identity has been expressed. Whenever any of these works are performed, either at home or abroad, clear-cut evidence of Nigerian, national identity is always observed and enjoyed by the audience.

The Manifestation of Nigerian National identity through Popular Music

Nigerian popular music has played a remarkable role in promoting a sense of Nigerian identity. Though there are aspects of the work of certain popular artists which may raise some questions on issues of moral conduct and values, the fact remains that popular music has immensely excelled, by primarily promoting a national cultural identity. That is because, as a commercial music genre, it is accessible to people from all walks of life. By contrast, classical art music is notably for a few members of the elite in

society. Many Nigerian popular artistes have expressed Nigerian cultural identity in their music. In their efforts to assimilate foreign influences, they have not lost sight of Nigerian elements, as the basis for their music production. Examples of some Nigerian popular music genres are: highlife, *Juju*, Afro-beat, *apala*, *fuji*, *sakara*, *waka*, *sewele* and gospel. Gospel musicians today make use of instrumental and vocal styles of the other popular genres mentioned. The music of many notable Nigerian popular musicians have been nationally and globally accepted in the world of entertainment music. Popular musicians draw from musical material from different parts of the country in order to present their music as a national idiom rather than "just" ethnic and tribal idiom. By doing this, Nigerian national identity is achieved both in instrumentation and in language delivery style. Occasionally, artistes from different linguistic backgrounds combine to release very impressive albums for public consumption. The fact that such music also delivers useful messages to the public, on day-to-day happenings in society, should not be brushed aside.

King Sunny Ade organized a get-together for many popular music artistes from across the country. The outcome of that meeting was the release of an album titled "The way forward", SDLC 017. Several Nigerian languages feature in this performance, for an effective delivery of the message, regarding the fostering of unity among Nigerians. Ayinde Wasiu released an album in which he used the *ngedegwu* (xylophone) as part of his instrumentation. Igbo dance style features prominently in the rendition.

Further highlights concerning the achievements of some other Nigerian popular music artistes in fostering Nigerian national identity are listed here: Victor Olaiya promoted highlife music beyond national boundaries, into the international realm. He was awarded an honorary doctorate in Music by a Czech university. I.K. Dairo was awarded an M.B.E. by Queen Elizabeth II of England. Celestine Ukuwu, Osita Osadebe, Rex Jim Lawson, Roy Chicago, the composer of "wa-zo-bia", a song in which three major Nigerian languages are reflected – hence the words "wa" (Yoruba), "zo" (Hausa) and "bia" (Igbo) - all meaning "come". Adeolu Akinsanya popularized highlife music both at home and abroad. Among other pioneering exponents of Nigerian popular music, who manifested cultural identity in their music, are Ambrose Campbell, the composer of "Ero Ya,", Bobby Benson, the composer of "Iya mi lo fi mi fun" and "Taxi Driver", Chris Ajilo, Sonny Okosun, the composer of "My papa's land", Eddy Okonta, Zeal Onyia and Victor Uwaifor. Other *juju* exponents of repute are Tunde, the western Nightingale, Dele Abiodun, Orlando Owoh and Ebenezer Obey. In the genre of Afro- beat, Fela Anikulapo Kuti remains the originator and the most reputed exponent whose music represents a remarkable African idiom. The vocal delivery is usually in pidgin English, a Nigerian coined language of the semi-educated masses. Along Fela's line of music is that of Lagbaja, Femi Kuti and Seun Kuti.

Some exponents of other Nigerian, popular music genres that may be mentioned are Ayinde Barister, Ayinla Kollington, Ayinde Wasiu, Adewale Ayuba and Pasuma Wonder. All of these are reputable exponents of *fuji* music. They have promoted *fuji* as a Nigerian-derived, popular music both at home and abroad. Salawatu Abeni and Iyaladuke are notable exponents of *waka* and *sewele* music respectively, while Haruna Isola and S. Aka are popularly known as *apala* and *sakara* exponents respectively. Musiliu Isola is actively following his father's profession and honouring the legacy.

Mention should be made of Nigerian gospel music. Evidence has shown that gospel music artistes such as Bola Aare, Toun Soetan and others have promoted gospel music, not only within Nigeria, but also internationally.

Conclusion

Since the existence of Nigeria as a united entity, music has been found to be a very important art form through which a sense of the nation's identity is manifested. In spite of the cultural diversity inherent in the ethnic and tribal grouping within the nation, Nigerians remain united members of the same society, a situation often described as "Unity in Diversity". In assessing the forces behind our bond of unity, music has been found to be one of the most important factors. Generally, Nigerians are highly gifted in all art forms, especially music. Music has thus been used advantageously in promoting a spirit of cultural nationalism. In doing this, a spirit of patriotism is enhanced which at the same time, fosters a sense of belonging. The overall result is the manifestation of a sense of national identity through music.

In achieving the objective set for this write-up, the author has examined three prominent areas of musical creativity. These are, in sequence; traditional, art and popular music. It is evident that music is a very important aspect of the cultural heritage of Nigerians. Furthermore, people are very good at interacting with people from other cultures of the world and assimilating their cultural traits. As a result, other cultural legacies from the West and the East (Arab world) have influenced their musical creativity. Generation after generation of each of the previously mentioned practitioners of music had worked relentlessly to manifest, through music, the spirit of Nigerian national identity. Through this, Nigerian, cultural heritage and innovations based on it go a long way towards promoting the image and the cultural values of the nation. Care should be taken not to portray Nigeria's image and cultural values negatively, whether through music or through other works of art.

Bibliography

1. J.H.K. Nketia, (1974), The Music of Africa. Victor Gollancz Ltd. London.
2. Ibid. P.3.
3. Ibid. P.4.
4. A. Lomax, (1968), Folk Song Style and Culture. Transaction Books. New Brunswick, New Jersey. P.274.
5. A. Adegbite, (2001), 'The Present State of Development of African Art Music in Nigeria'. In African Art Music in Nigeria, (Fela Sowande Memorial), Stirling-Horden Publishers (Nig.) Ltd. Lagos, Ibadan, Benin City, Jattu-Uzairue, Pp. 58-69.
6. O. Olaniyan, (2001), 'A Discourse of Yoruba Lyrics (Otherwise Known as Native Airs) As Contemporary Art Music for Christian Worship'. In African Art Music in Nigeria (Fela Sowande Memorial). Op cit. P.59.
7. Ibid.
8. O.O. Bateye, (2001). In African Art Music in Nigeria (Fela Sowande Memorial). Ibid. Pp. 117-126.

Failures in the Provision of Free Public Basic Education in Ghana

Background To Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education (FCUBE)

Judith S. Sawyerr

In 1992, Ghana returned to constitutional democracy after more than twenty years of military rule under different regimes. During the last five years of this period, the educational system underwent a series of major reforms designed to improve access and quality, make the curriculum more relevant to the needs of a developing country, place basic schools under the control of local communities, and undo the vestiges of the colonial system of education. The number of years in pre-tertiary education was reduced while the Ordinary and Advanced Level Examinations system was scrapped. In its place, a 6-3-3 system (6 years primary, 3 years Junior Secondary School and 3 years Senior Secondary School) was introduced to cover pre-tertiary education.

The Constitution of Ghana, 1992 (Article 25.1a), guaranteed education as a basic right for all children. It also set a target of ten years, allowing for a two year grace period to enable machinery to be put in place, by which time all children should be receiving 'Free Compulsory Universal Basic Education' (FCUBE), which included six years of primary and three years of junior secondary school (Article 38 of the 1992 Constitution). Senior secondary education for a further three years would be available to those who qualified and could benefit from more academic grounding, but it would not be free.

By the end of 2003, realising that it could not meet the Constitutional targets for FCUBE in the next year, the government made a strategic shift in policy by adopting the programme of the United Nations-supported Millennium Development Goals of Education for All by 2015. Under this policy, all children would receive at least six years of schooling. The guarantee of *basic education* was reduced to six years of *primary school*. This was in reality a step backwards for Ghana, considering the fact that the Constitutional guarantee of *basic* education initially entailed nine years of free schooling, not six.

The following tables show the enrolment situation in the country between 2002 and 2003, when the government changed its policy.

Primary School (Years 1-6) Enrolment in Ghana [1]

Year	Entry into Primary Class 1 as % of 6 year olds	Primary 6 Completion Rate as % of 11 year olds	Gross Enrolment Ratio (%)	Pupils in Non-Government Schools (%)
2001-2	81.5	65.6	78.9	18.3
2002-3*	82.9	68.2	84.2	17.5

Junior Secondary School (Years 6-9) Enrolment in Ghana [2]

Year	Enrolment Rate In JSS 1 (Year 7) as a % of Population Aged 12	Completion Rate Of JSS 3 (Year 9) as a % of Population Aged 14	Gross Enrolment Ratio (%)	Pupils In Non-Government Schools (%)
2001-2	62	54	61.7	14.3
2002- 3*	65	57	65	14.6

While the gross enrolment and completion rates show a rise over the period, these tables indicate two disturbing trends. These are the proportion of children who never enrol in primary school, and the high dropout rate between entry at class one and completion of JSS 3, the final year of basic education.

It is interesting to note that the report issued by the Commission for Africa expresses serious doubts as to whether the objective of universal primary education will ever be attained on the African continent before the end of this century, given the slow pace of change and the current availability of resources.[3]

How FCUBE Became fCUBE

The guarantee of free education was another problematic issue. In 1997, the Ministry of Education abolished the payment of fees in public schools at the Basic Education level. However with the declining fortunes of Ghana's economy, the structural adjustment policy of the IMF and the World Bank during the period between 1986 and 2000, and the increasing demand for education created by a growing population,[4] there were shortfalls of revenue to support public basic education in all parts of the country. The Ministry of Education allowed the District Assemblies to *levy* parents and guardians for education and development. These levies, not to be called 'fees', covered such things as PTA dues, examination costs, culture, sports, library, health, furniture expenses, etc. In fact, in some districts there were as many as ten different levies charged to parents. The FCUBE policy had become fCUBE, with the small 'f' symbolising a very diminished 'free'.

The Real Cost of Basic Education for Parents

Income levels in Ghana are very low, even for those in formal employment. In February 2005, the legal daily minimum wage, excluding casual rural farm workers, was raised to ¢13,500 ($1.45). While very few salaried workers in Accra would earn as little as the minimum wage, average take home pay for unskilled and semi-skilled workers in the public/private sector ranges from ¢500,000 to ¢700,000 per month ($54.00 to $76.00). This comes to ¢6 million to ¢8.4 million ($ 652.00 to $913.00) per year. Approximately 50% of the Accra population earn a living from the informal sector, mainly petty trading. Incomes in this sector are generally low.

The actual cost of keeping a child in primary and junior secondary school in Ghana is quite significant. In an unpublished report commissioned by ActionAid Ghana in 2003,[5] the annual cost was estimated to be $20.00 for a child in Basic Education in some of the most deprived communities, especially in the three Northern regions. At the time, the poorest residents in those communities declared an *annual* income of around US $12.00 equivalent. Given the fact that the fertility rate in Ghana is still very high (averaging 4.2 children per woman), the family resources required to support several children in basic education pose a serious challenge to school enrolment and retention in such communities. Statistics show that girls are especially disadvantaged because they are the first to be kept out of school or withdrawn when financial difficulties arise.[6]

In two typical Accra public basic schools, surveyed recently by the National Partnership for Children's Trust, an Accra based charity, the average cost to parents of keeping a child in primary class 6, JSS 1 and 2, and JSS 3, ranged from $60.00 (¢552,000) to $110.00 (¢1,012,000) per annum.[7] The cost was made up as follows: levies, textbooks, stationery, examination fees, uniform, shoes, socks, belt and school bag. This does not cover snacks, nor transport to and from school for those who live beyond walking distance. While the Ghana Education Service approved levies averaging $4.00 (¢36,800) per annum, which alone might not be significant, the cost of the required textbooks for the year came to as much as $45 (¢414,000) at the highest grade. One textbook for both primary and junior secondary school costs $4.90 (¢45,000). A child needs a minimum of three textbooks in primary school, while one in junior secondary school requires ten per year. Although books are supposed to be supplied free, the reality is that there are not even enough for use in the classroom. A pupil without the required textbooks is therefore at a serious disadvantage.

In the Dangme East District of Greater Accra, a deprived fishing community located about 100 kilometres east of the capital, the Ghana Education Service (GES) listed the charges to parents for basic public education per year as ranging from $6.40 (¢59,000) for upper primary, to $12.40 (¢114,000) for junior secondary school 3. This covered levies, examination fees, exercise books, pens, pencils, rulers and maths sets but excluded books, uniforms, socks, belt, shoes and bags. Textbooks were not part of the official list even though they were not available in the schools because most parents were just too poor to buy them.[8] Fees for the West African Examination Council's Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE), taken at the end of junior secondary school for promotion to senior secondary, school were fixed separately.

It is not surprising that ordinary working families are struggling to keep their children in school, a situation that is exacerbated by the fact that most families have three or four children to cater for. In Dangme East, GES officials report that many children below the age of 15 years are being forced to work as fisher boys, oyster miners, mat weavers and salt winners on a part time basis to find the money needed to pay for public school, while others drop out of school to fend for themselves.[9] In Accra, many children are compelled to do jobs such as shoe shining, portering, and selling ice water for long periods each day. This poses a serious threat to the health and safety of these unfortunate children.

A Case Study: Working While in School

Linda is a 14-year-old girl who attends a public junior secondary school in Accra. The head teacher of her school describes her as bright. However, this year her grades have slipped. Investigations showed that she sells ice water near the Military Hospital after school everyday from about 1.00 – 6.00 pm to earn some extra money when she is on the morning school shift. Currently she lives with her older married sister, brother-in-law and young nephews in the police barracks. Her sister, who dropped out of school before she finished Junior Secondary School when she became pregnant, does not want the same fate for Linda. However, the family income is limited. Linda moved in with her married sister about a year ago because the treatment she was receiving from her stepmother and older half siblings was unbearable. Her biological mother is dead and her father is very old.

A Case Study: Never Enrolled in School

Johaney is an 8 year old boy who lives on Aflive Island on the Volta River, in the Dangme East District of Greater Accra. He has never been to school but wants to "learn and play football with the others." His mother, who weaves mats and sells oysters for a living, cannot afford to send him and his siblings to school. The children's father lives in Akosombo, a town about 60 kilometres away, where he works as a fisherman on the lake.

The Ghana Child Labour Survey done in 2001 found that 40 per cent of an estimated 6.36 million children in the age group between five and seventeen were engaged in economic activity. About 1.59 million of them were working while in school. Many of the jobs these children were doing were considered dangerous or harmful to health.[10]

Below are the Enrolment Pictures in Basic Education in Accra District and Dangme East for the 2003-04 period:

Accra District Enrolment: 2003 –04 School Year For Public and Private Schools[11]

	Total	Number in Public School	Number in Private School	% Private
Primary	175,960	99,544	76,416	43.4
Junior Secondary	89,067	44,781	30,880	34.7

Dangme East Enrolment: 2003-04 for Public and Private Schools[12]

	Total	Private	% Private
Primary	16,412	1,383	8.4

Junior Secondary	4,717	259	5.5

Many people assume that the problems related to enrolment and retention in basic education in Ghana exist only in remote, rural communities. In Dangme East District at least **30%** of children age 6 + never enrol in primary school in the first place. [13]

The tables above show a disturbing attrition rate between primary and junior secondary school. For the Accra district it is almost 12%, while for Dangme East, a peri-urban area of the country's most populated district, the rate is 38%. If one assumes that most of the children who leave the private schools after primary level do not drop out but rather move to the public junior secondary schools because of the fees, then the drop out rate for public schools is even higher.

The District Superintendent of the Ghana Education Service (GES) in Ada (Dangme East) gave the main reasons for the high drop out rate after primary school as:

1. The inability of parents to pay the charges
2. The over age of some of the pupils, many of whom do not start primary 1 at 6 years old
3. The frustration students feel in their poor performance
4. Girls getting pregnant
5. The difficulty in combining work and study for those children forced to earn money.

In Dangme East, one boy who obtained an aggregate of 6 (the top score) in the 2004 BECE dropped out of school. His father decided that the boy should become a carpenter rather than continue his education in secondary school. GES officials, who were dismayed at this situation, could not convince the father to change his mind.[14]

The Issue of Quality in Public Basic Education

The discussion in this section of the paper will focus on schools in the Greater Accra Region where the writer has had direct access to schools. However, it can be assumed that conditions in other regions are generally as poor, if not worse.

Physical structures in many of the Accra public schools are below standard. Few, if any, have libraries, science rooms or computers. Basic sanitation is woefully lacking. In the two schools mentioned previously (Kanda and Nima Cluster Schools) there were no proper toilet facilities for the student population of 2000 pupils that attend classes in each school in two shifts daily. One school had running water, while the other did not. Many of the structures have cracks and leaking roofs, while furniture is dilapidated. Although some money is allocated to head teachers for minor repairs, it is woefully inadequate to cover any major structural renovations. This is the responsibility of the Accra Metropolitan Assembly, who often push the burden back to the parents, claiming that the schools belong to the community.

In Dangme East, the physical structures of the basic schools on the main land and on two islands, surveyed by a team from the Ghana National Campaign Coalition (GNECC), were generally in adequate condition. Only 10 out of 68 public primary schools were in poor condition. Toilet facilities were a problem because there was no water available in most mainland schools. None of the junior secondary schools had science labs, workshops or tools. The only computers available were a few that had been donated by benevolent individuals or organisations. Teaching aids in the primary schools were very scarce or non-existent. There was no library for the whole community with a population of 93,000.

The official policy of the Ghana Education Service is to supply textbooks to students in public basic education. The reality on the ground is quite different. In three schools visited in Accra, there were some books available for classroom use only, but not a complete set in any of the subjects. In Dangme East, GES admitted that most classes have between 5 and 10 tattered, old textbooks for a subject to be shared by 30 to 40+ pupils. In the junior secondary schools, books are several years out of date because of the changes in syllabuses. In the public schools, some parents buy textbooks for their children, but many do not because of the expense. By contrast, in private schools, parents are forced to buy the books for their children so that they are well equipped for school and homework.

The professional standard of the teachers in the public schools, at least in Greater Accra, is adequate for the task. Virtually all of them are qualified, having at least Teacher Training Certification, though many have higher Diplomas or degrees. Since Accra is considered a desirable area to live in as opposed to a remote, disadvantaged rural community, it is relatively easy to recruit and retain teachers in the city. The pupil teacher ratios fall within accepted norms (1:32). On the other hand, many of the teachers in the private unregistered basic schools are not qualified, having completed only Senior Secondary School. Teacher pupil ratios in many of these private schools are much higher than in the public schools, especially those that are profit making, but are not properly registered (1:40+).

The problem with teachers in the public sector is not the lack of qualifications, but the lack of supervision. Ghana Education Service personnel in both Accra and Dangme East admitted that the inspectorate section is not functioning properly, so that it is almost impossible to remove incompetent teachers. Head teachers have no authority in this regard. GES personnel confessed that they rarely inspected the island schools because they were afraid of crossing the river by boat.

If we look at two indicators of performance in basic education, the deficiencies in the public sector become apparent. This may also explain why so many parents, including many employees of the Ghana Education Service (GES) prefer to send their children to private schools. The first indice is the Criterion Referenced Tests, administered by the Ministry of Education up to 2002, to test the performance of primary school children in mathematics and English at the end of class 6. Results for the 2002 test are shown in the table below.

Criterion Referenced Tests for Primary Class 6 Pupils in Ghana, August 2002[15]

Subject	**Public Schools**		**Private Schools**	
	Mean	Percentage Reaching Mastery	Mean	Percentage Reaching Mastery
English	39.8	12.7	60.7	56.8
Mathematics	33.7	5.6	46.5	16.0

Grades from this test showed clearly that in English, at least, private schools out performed public ones by a very significant margin. Although the difference in results for mathematics was not as glaring, the pupils' performance in private schools was still better.

The other indicator was the results in the Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE), the national examination that students take in all subjects at the end of nine years of education. The table below shows the percentage of pupils who passed the BECE examination with aggregates 6-30, which qualified them for entry into senior secondary school. If we consider the fact that only 57.5% of pupils in

2003 got to this stage, a mere 30% of the age group successfully completed the junior secondary school level at age 15+.

Pass Rate (Aggregates 6-30) in the BECE Examination for all of Ghana[16]

Year	% of passes
2001	60.40
2002	60.48
2003	61.56
2004	61.18

If one looks at the BECE results for the Accra district in 2004, out of the 402 junior secondary schools that entered candidates, 105 had 100% passes with aggregates 6-30. Only four of these schools were genuine public schools with no church or other affiliation such as the university or military.[17] Accra had one school with no passes, and seven schools had pass rates of less than 30%.[18] Six of these were public schools.

In Dangme East, 1243 pupils took the BECE Examination in 2004. The total number that qualified with aggregates 6-30 came to 683 representing 54.9 %. This is lower than the national average of 61.1%. The district ranked 52 out of 110. Only 5.4% or 62 of them were in private schools. If we assume that all those in the private schools passed, then the percent that passed in public schools would be slightly lower than 54.9%. If we consider that 50% had dropped out of school before completing junior secondary school, then only 22% of the JSS leavers in Dangme East could even be considered for secondary school.

In some deprived districts such as Yilo Krobo, Ahafo Ano South and Gushiegu/Karaga, some schools have recorded no passes in the BECE for many years. This means that none of the pupils who left those junior secondary schools entered senior secondary school.[19]

The Government's Response to the Problems in Basic Education

The current Government was elected into office in 2000 with a promise to reform the educational system that it believed had failed the majority of young people in the country. Two years later it commissioned two reports, the *Ministry of Education's Education Sector Review* (October 2002) and *The President's Committee on Review of Education Reforms in Ghana* (October 2002). Both reports agreed that there were serious deficiencies in the teaching and learning outcomes in public education.

At the end of 2004, the Government issued a White Paper on the Reform Review Report outlining its proposed policies to solve the numerous problems outlined. Its acknowledgement that the high level of students' attrition in the course of pre-tertiary education, but especially at age 15, "cannot be afforded by any socially responsible system of governance."[20] This is an honest assessment of the situation. But the lack of an urgent, binding timeframe is rather disquieting.

The following proposals in the White Paper drew universal condemnation when it was reviewed at a stakeholders meeting of the Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition (GNECC) recently:[21]

1. Changing the names of junior secondary and senior secondary schools to junior high and senior high schools.
2. Extending the duration of senior high school to four years from the current three.

The Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition (GNECC) felt that these changes were unnecessary and would be very costly to both parents and the government, both of which were already

overburdened. These recommendations did not to deal with the real issues defined as access, equity and quality. The White Paper recommended that basic education should comprise eleven years of schooling, comprised as follows:

1. Two years of preschool
2. Six years of primary school
3. Three years of junior secondary school (junior high school)

This proposal was universally endorsed by GNECC at the same assembly. The concern raised was whether basic education would really be "free" as defined in the Constitution. Adding two more years to the cycle and expecting parents to foot the bill through additional levies, would not bring a favourable outcome.

The Ministry of Education issued an Education Strategic Plan (ESP) to cover the period 2003-2015 as its working guide to achieve Education For All, which was universal primary education by 2015. The authorities had confidently declared that the plan would succeed and the goals attained this time because the required funding had been worked into the current efforts. This notwithstanding, the plan still relies heavily on donor aid. Estimates from the World Bank put the amount needed from external sources at $19 million per annum. Other sources claim much higher figures.[22]

The government's introduction of capitation grants to serve forty deprived districts (out of 110) in the country initiated at the start of the 2004-05 school year was one of the initial steps taken in fulfilment of the ESP to improve enrolment and retention. These grants averaging about ¢100,000 per child were rather modest when one considered the cost of textbooks alone. Already reports have emerged from grant-receiving districts that head teachers were not using them judiciously.[23] Budget tracking will have to be done to ensure donor funds they are properly utilised.

The President's pronouncement at a Public Forum on 23 March 2005, that with immediate effect the government had launched its compulsory basic education programme, was rather confusing considering that the Education Strategic Plan (ESP) for Education For All (EFA) had already commenced in 2003. His proposed capitation grant, also announced, of ¢20,000 or $2.00 to all first cycle (primary school) pupils in support of basic education can hardly bring much anticipation given the dire situation in the public education sector. Furthermore, it was not clear if this was a one off grant or something that would be repeated.

Some Modest Suggestions for the Real Way Forward for Public Basic Education

The real problems facing basic public education in Ghana today are:

1. Enrolment and retention
2. Poor infrastructure
3. Lack of teaching aids and learning materials
4. Lack of motivated teachers
5. Inadequate supervision and management

All of these problems have been repeatedly identified as the real issues by almost all reports and studies commissioned by the government and by stakeholder forums. To overcome them, a large amount of investment in both material and human resources is necessary, as well as a sincere demonstration of political will on the part of government. For a start, all charges and levies that keep children out of school or

affect their learning must be abolished. Such things as textbooks, exercise books, pens and pencils must be provided free. For the very poorest children, uniforms and shoes, bags and even lunch should be made available.

A phased-in programme for rehabilitating structures and erecting additional ones needs to be established. Although money from the Ghana Education Trust Fund (GET) is available for this purpose, disbursement needs to be more efficient and transparent. Already too many buildings have been started and left uncompleted. Since teachers are the backbone of any educational system, they must be properly remunerated and their conditions of service made more attractive. The country has a shortage of 24,000 trained teachers, especially in deprived, rural areas. Therefore special incentives are necessary to interest young men and women to train and go to work as teachers in these areas.

The monitoring and supervision of teachers needs to be improved. Those who are dedicated and hard working need to be rewarded, while those who do not fit in need to be removed. Far too many incompetent, negligent and even dangerous characters remain in the system. Almost all GES officials interviewed have stressed the fact that private schools perform better because the heads can hire and fire and insist on a high level of performance from teachers. There is no reason why this cannot apply in the public sector.

The country has made a commitment to Education For All in the next ten years. If it cannot guarantee every child at least a decent primary education, the country's future looks bleak. If on the other hand the government succeeds in its education objectives, there is light at the end of the tunnel.

Notes

1. Annual Education Sector Educational Plan 2003-2005 (AESOP), Ministry of Education, Accra, 2003. Projected figures.
2. Ibid. Projected figures.
3. Report of the Blair Commission on Africa, March 2005.
4. Listed as 2.7% per annum in IMF Staff Estimates quoted in Ghana Human Development Report 2004 (draft).
5. The Cost of Education, ActionAid Ghana, 2003 (unpublished).
6. The enrolment ratio of girls enrolled in primary schools was 47.2%, and in JSS, 45.3%, in 2002, Ministry of Education, Accra, Strategic Plan, Volume 1, 2002.
7. The Kanda Cluster of School and the Nima Cluster of Schools, Accra.
8. Ghana Education Service, Ada, Dangme East, Ghana.
9. GES, Op cit.
10. Daily Graphic, March 23, 2005.
11. SRIMPR, Ministry of Education, Accra.
12. Ibid.
13. Ghana Education Service, Dangme East.
14. Dangme East GES.
15. Report on the 2002 Administration of Primary 6 Criterion –Referenced Test, Ministry of Education, Accra, October 2004.
16. West African Exams Council, Accra, 2003.
17. SRIMPR Division, Ministry of Education, Accra.
18. SRIMPR Division, Ministry of Education, Accra.
19. Ibid.
20. The White Paper, page 5.
21. GNECC's General Assembly at Tamale, 16-18 March 2005.

22. Ibid.
23. GNECC in Central Region reported that one head teacher used the money to buy band instruments.

The Political Wrath of Hurricane Katrina

Paul Tiyambe Zeleza

Like most people in the United States, I have been transfixed by the horrific images of the death and destruction wrought by hurricane Katrina on the U.S. Gulf Coast. The proud city of New Orleans, the birthplace of jazz and so much of what is original in American popular culture, stands deluged in a combustible slew of devastation, despair, and fury. Americans are shocked by the criminal incompetence of their government, which seeks refuge in the wrath of nature, not in its own ineptitude and indifference. Those of us from Africa are familiar with this script: how drought is used as an alibi for famine. At least African governments can plead poverty, however self-serving and misleading that plea is. The rest of the world watched with surprise, sympathy, and scorn. Many have offered assistance, to America's obvious embarrassment, rather than gratitude. Katrina has sunk New Orleans and America's sense of greatness. The world's lone superpower has become ordinary.

Katrina is the anti-9-11. Nine-eleven stunned the United States into patriotic fervor at home and imperial rage abroad but Katrina has stoked deep national divisions and widespread international derision. Disasters, whether natural or man-made, and Katrina is both, are revelatory mirrors that expose a society's subterranean fissures, the existing socioeconomic inequalities and political pathologies. Katrina has provided a giant and agonizing mirror for America, in the full view of the world it normally despises, forcing it to look squarely in the face, to its profound shock and shame, all those marginalized people it silences with its strange but seductive myths of equal opportunity and the American dream. Race and class, the enduring systemic and symbolic deformities that mark and mock the fantasies of American exceptionalism, have reared their simmering presence in the teeming masses that was huddled in the biotoxic sports arenas, the sweltering patches of broken bridges, or waving desperately from the rooftops of submerged buildings. Many more of them probably remain trapped or buried in their flooded homes, and bloated bodies are floating in the rivers that have overtaken the streets of tourist revelry.

The immediate victims of Katrina's wrath, then, are all those invisible people who are normally hidden in the sewers of the service economy that has grown with the growing de-industrialization of America. They are mostly poor and black, a grim testimony to the limits of the civil rights movement that ended legal racial segregation, but left the seclusions of economic class intact. In fact, the gap between the rich and poor in America has never been wider than it is now. The ranks of those living below the poverty line have swelled, and downward class mobility for the beleaguered middle classes is more likely than upward mobility. Clearly, the ferocious storms of Katrina have ripped open the fault lines of American

society in a way that the furious fires of 9-11 did not and could not. Nine-eleven was an act of terror that could be blamed on evil foreigners. Katrina, as an environmental disaster, could not be blamed on anyone. With no external enemy to focus the nation's anguish and rage, attention has turned inward to the social identities of the victims and the ineffectiveness of state intervention.

Nine-eleven was an assault on the financial and military citadels of America, which not only provoked swift state response, its victims were not marked in terms of color and class because many were white and well-off: racial and class markers are often reserved for the poor and racial minorities. I have been struck, although not surprised, by the derogatory and racist language that has been used in the media to describe the victims of Katrina – the obsession with violence and the different descriptions of whites "helping" themselves and blacks "looting" from deserted shops, and the unflattering, indeed, contemptuous comparisons with the Third World and Africa, that conditions in New Orleans are more befitting those benighted places than America.

This is the rhetoric of denial and dismissal, denial that poverty and the exploitation and marginalization of blacks have always been an integral part of the U.S., indeed fundamental to its growth and development, and dismissal of the African American poor as failed citizens who rightly belong to their underdeveloped ancestral homeland. Indeed, African Americans as a whole seem to suffer from double disenfranchisement: they have yet to be perceived by the larger white society as fellow citizens and fellow human beings. Katrina has shown how deeply embedded both poverty and blacks are in America's social ecology, which no amount of rhetoric about the United States being the wealthiest country in the world or the statistical myth that blacks are no longer America's largest minority - a status supposedly usurped by Hispanics who, however, can be of any race - can hide.

The social dynamics of race and class, and the differences in the nature of the two disasters might explain the relatively slow and chaotic response of the American government to the wrath of Katrina compared to the terrorist attacks of 9-11. But there are two other powerful forces at work: one is Iraq, the costly and disastrous military adventure that links 9-11 to Katrina, and the other is neo-liberal ideology that connects the muddle of the relief effort to the failures of public policy. Nine-eleven facilitated the American invasion of Iraq, while the quagmire in Iraq has fostered America's impotence before Katrina. If Iraq has weakened America's capacity to manage a domestic disaster of the magnitude of Katrina, the latter will most likely weaken America's capacity to prevail in the war in Iraq given the scale of the resistance. The reason for this lies both in the sheer material costs of managing the two disasters, and also the crucial link that, I think, Americans may be finally making between the Iraq war and domestic well-being. America's enemies are likely to draw their own connections as well: already underawed by America's military prowess in Iraq they are unlikely to be impressed by its ability to manage large scale disasters at home, both of which might increase America's vulnerability to terrorism.

While it is foolhardy to underestimate the country's economic capacity, let alone the popular will to rebuild shattered infrastructures and communities, the United States does not have infinite resources. The levels of its budget deficits and national debt are unsustainable in the long term. China and cheap energy have helped keep the economic bubble afloat. Oil prices were already rising steeply before Katrina and spiked sharply afterwards because of damage to the region's important oil production and refining industry and if they remain high, the effects will ripple throughout the economy, especially the already troubled airline and automobile industries. This was already turning to be the summer when support for the Iraq war finally tipped and stayed in negative territory, and most of the displaced people - uncharitably and incorrectly called refugees - who were interviewed in the peripatetic media made the link between military

commitments in Iraq and the incompetence and disarray of the relief effort. Interestingly, in both gulfs - the Middle East Gulf region and the stricken U.S. Gulf Coast - salvation is seen to lie in the hands of the military. Indeed, some of the troops being deployed in the areas shattered by Katrina are veterans of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.

The spectacle of the military as a hurricane relief force raises troubling questions about the capacities of the civilian agencies. Nine-eleven reinforced the militarization of homeland security; Katrina has exposed the impoverishment of human security in an important but vulnerable region. Listening to the befuddled director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) make the rounds of TV interviews, I was stunned by his mendacity and fecklessness and of many other officials from the vast Department of Homeland Security itself to which FEMA belongs. They pleaded ignorance, that they could not foresee the full impact of Katrina, that the levees that keep New Orleans a livable city below sea level would break.

FEMA itself, numerous agencies and studies, had long predicted that New Orleans would be devastated by any major hurricane landing on its shores eroded by developers allowed to usurp wetlands and barrier islands. In fact, in 2001 FEMA had warned that New Orleans presented one of the country's top three most likely catastrophic disasters. I was reminded of those African leaders who feign surprise when drought, which is quite predictable in its regularity strikes, resulting in crop failures and food shortages.

At stake is neither the ignorance of state officials, nor the lethal power, let alone the capricious unpredictability of Katrina. Rather, as the world has since learned, the levees were in a terrible state of disrepair thanks to massive budget cuts, by nearly half since 2001, for funds requested by the corps of engineers to maintain and fix the levees. There were no adequate plans to evacuate the poor and vulnerable who had no means to leave as Katrina roared to the Gulf Coast. Those with resources - from cars and money to the social capital of relations and friends in unaffected cities and states across the region and the country - both black and white, left. Thus Katrina is essentially a crisis of public policy, of the provision of public goods and pursuit of collective action: building and maintaining the public infrastructure in normal times and providing public assistance for vulnerable people in times of disaster.

The effects of this public policy crisis have been seen in the gruesome television images of public disorder and desolation, of people in a major American city stripped of their dignity, and sometimes civility, scavenging for food and water, without shelter and toilets, distraught children too tired to cry, gaunt old people dying in their wheel chairs, and patients in dimly lit hospitals hanging by the thread of empty tubes and the heroic efforts of distressed doctors and nurses. Since the world economic crisis of the 1970s, neo-liberalism has been the dominant ideology of economic policy and management, its ascendancy buttressed by the collapse of actually existing socialism and American post-cold war triumphalism. Africa and other parts of the global South have two "lost decades" to show for the perilous inanities of neo-liberalism, imposed with religious zealotry by the international financial institutions, with all their global capitalist might, cheered on by successive U.S. governments.

The United States has been under the regime of what in Africa we call structural adjustment programs (SAPs) since the advent of the Reagan administration in 1980. The Republican mantra, which Democrats have largely acquiesced to, has been getting the government off people's backs, that is, reducing government expenditures and cutting taxes. For the developing countries, including many in Africa, SAPs have led to the erosion of the developmental advances achieved in the pre-SAP days, growing indebtedness, deepening social inequalities and insecurities, and rising poverty. Under this ruthless

regime of accumulation the relative exploitation and repression of labor and racial minorities in the United States has increased as can be seen in the growing income gaps between workers and executives and the backlash against civil rights.

But given its global power, the U.S. has been able to deflect and "hide" some of the costs of SAPs by importing vast quantities of capital through both direct investments and debt - the U.S. is the world's largest debtor nation. Iraq has dented the facade of superpower military invincibility and Katrina has exposed the underbelly of neo-liberalism in America, the infrastructure and communities that have been neglected for a generation, sacrificed on the altar of a fundamentalist economic and political ideology that punishes the poor and rewards the rich. Since this is a highly racialized country the class dynamics of neo-liberalism are interpenetrated with the unyielding hierarchies of race. Hence, the iconic images of the victims of Katrina are the black poor.

Nine-eleven elevated a selected lackluster president into a national leader; Katrina has severely weakened the recently re-elected president's leadership. Shattered is the aura of a "can do leader" and government competence, and the administration's mask of unflappable confidence often hiding uninformed complacency and ideological fanaticism that does not even countenance the scientific consensus about global warming, which many believe is responsible for the growing strength and frequency of hurricanes. It is easier to lie about the anarchy in far away Iraq than the mayhem within the United States itself, to control the flow of images of the American dead and wounded from Baghdad than the flood of images of the desperate and dying in the Big Easy.

It is tempting to lay the blame for the tragedy of Katrina, which has yet to yield its full horrors from the muddy depths of the flooded streets and homes, entirely on the shoulders of the Bush administration, which brought the imbroglio of Iraq upon itself against the wise counsel of history and anti-war activists that Iraq would not be the walkover dreamt by the neo-conservatives (neo-cons), and diverted much-needed resources that could have facilitated a quicker and better response to the wrath of Katrina. Large amounts of equipment and numbers of the National Guard - one third of Louisiana's and even more from Mississippi - who are often used in state and national emergences were in Iraq.

President Bush has never been known for his eloquence, or sympathies for the poor or blacks, notwithstanding an ivy-league education and the pretensions of "compassionate conservatism." His approval ratings were already plummeting before the calamity of Katrina, which has become his biggest domestic political crisis, and has the potential to sink his second term agenda in a quagmire of recriminations and mistrust.

The president's initial ineffectual handling of the hurricane may reinforce an already widespread perception that he fancies himself more as a "war" president than an engaged leader, more interested in beefing up military security than social security, pursuing policies that demand sacrifices from the poor but not the rich. But Bush did not invent Reaganomics and previous administrations largely neglected the levees following the New Orleans floods of 1965.

What has happened under the watch of the Bush Administration is that racial neo-liberalism at home, and the imperialist adventurism of the neo-cons abroad, reached their apogee as the massive tax cuts favoring the richest Americans have amply demonstrated. Hurricane Katrina has brought home to Americans the dangers, to their own security and self-image, of this explosive brew. One senses a growing loss of confidence in the ability of the political class and institutions to safeguard the interests that matter, in the daily lives of most ordinary people.

Out of the floodwaters of New Orleans and the gulf coast as a whole, Katrina's political wrath has only just begun. The doctrinaire argument for small government may have lost its seductions. At stake is the future political direction of this country that has yet to fulfill its promises to its marginalized peoples and the rest of the world seeking peace and human security, development and democracy, rather than militarism and imperial bullying.

We would like to thank Black Commentator *for allowing this reprint from their Issue 49 of the 8th September 2005.*

Who Should Fear China?

Tan Chung

My lifelong experience in India tells me that in the third world, most of the information and insight into Chinese affairs does not originate from China, but is supplied by the Western press and literature, particularly by the USA and Britain. Though there is no dearth of excellent British and American scholars and reporters on the China topic, understanding China --- a country of the "Far East" --- via the media of the Western Hemisphere is like scratching itching toes with boots on.

China is a "sustainable", ancient civilization that has thrived for five millennia, which is comparable with India, while the rest of the world is either *newly civilized*, comparatively speaking, or separated from their ancient civilizational glories by millennia of "dark ages". Thus to understand China we must engage in a "civilizational discourse", wading through knee-deep civilizational sedimentation to get to the bottom of truth.

Geographically, China is in an enviable position, spatiality monopolizing two of the ten greatest rivers on earth, while the other eight are international rivers. The Chinese have always claimed the world's 6th greatest river, the Yellow River and 3rd greatest Yangtze River, to be the cradles of the Chinese civilization without any controversy – a rare phenomenon in troubled, polemic world politics. The Late Harvard China-expert, Prof. John King Fairbank, illustrated during the 1980s that the same number of over a billion people lived in 50 states all over the European and American continents, but under one political umbrella in China. Europe – the motherland of "divide and rule" and cesspool of two world wars – is today emulating China's historical example of homogenizing and harmonizing the socio-political and socio-economic existence of an entire continent in the 21st century.

Since Emperor Qin Shihuangdi unified China in 221 BC, a unique process of "bounded globalization", from the lower and middle streams of the Yellow River, extending to the present boundaries of China has started. It is "globalization" because a universe originally dotted with tribes as numerous and diverse in ethnicity, language and culture as Africa has been transformed into an integrated commonwealth of "super-state-hood" – differentiating from "nation-state-hood". It is "bounded" because the transforming dynamism respects China's boundaries, avoiding *outsourcing* her power and energy beyond. Of course, it's also true that these boundaries were pushed further and further in historical times, constituting a territorial expansion of sorts. But, this expansion was more due to the aggressiveness of China's neighbours than that of China herself.

Though the so-called "Han race" is a misnomer according to classical anthropological definitions (because "Han" is an artificial political identity, not a primordial geographical or ethnical consensus), we conventionally use the term to designate the locals living in the heartland of China. In two thousand years, there have been constant external invasions into the Han heartland, coupled with the continuous

acculturation of the non-Han invaders by the Han locals. Moreover, most of the major territorial expansions of China were carried out by China's non-Han rulers – like the Mongols and Manchus.

The non-alphabetic Han script proves to be the most effective unifying force in a "continent" of great diversity that is China. Another cementing force of sustainability within Chinese civilization is the paramountcy of "*guo*", which is the "state" in a glorified status. Chinese civilization glorifies the state institution like other civilizations glorify religion. This is underlined by the fact that while temples were generally named after gods in India, most of the India-imported Buddhist temples in China have had the name to bless the *guo*/state institution, and more often than not christened by the imperial Chinese government. Today, this paramountcy of *guo*/state persists not as a sign of Chinese antipathy against democracy, but because of the centripetal DNA of Chinese civilization. It is this centripetal DNA that has made China the concentration of 1/5, or more, of humanity through two thousand years of history. It is also this centripetal DNA that has quickly transformed China from the status of "the sick man of East Asia" into a near superpower of sports --- as shown by the Summer 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. In the 2008 Olympics in Beijing, China may further consolidate her parity with USA and Russia, or even eclipse both these sports superpowers.

All this is because Chinese civilization has placed its emphasis on "human harmony" ("*renhe*" in Chinese terminology), vis-à-vis the other two essential elements of human life, i.e. "celestial/seasonal environment" (*tianshi*) and "terrestrial/natural resources" (*dili*). While ancient Egyptians busied themselves in building imposing pyramids and ancient Greeks in carving out gigantic stone statues, in their quest for material power, Chinese were excavating the spiritual strength that smoothened human relationships. Modern scholars have correctly pointed out that ancient Chinese wisdom was no profound philosophical epistemology, but down-to-earth common sense ethics. We might term it "harmony ethic". Later, Indian pilgrims and their Chinese colleagues jointly created a kind of Buddhist culture named "Chan/Zen" that further strengthened the native "harmony ethic". Furthermore, the Indian concept of "equality" ("*samata*" in Sanskrit) stimulated Chinese peasants to rise in arms, not to create chaos, but to overthrow corrupt and insensitive regimes and rebuild the governmentality *de novo*. I call this Buddhism-inspired Chinese culture "struggle ethic". It was the dialectic interaction and vibration between the "harmony ethic" and "struggle ethic" that made Chinese civilization last. The new China today is like a phoenix rising from the ashes of revolutionary war --- a phenomenon exemplifying such dialectics.

During the 20th century, scores of former colonies gained independence through various means. China set a unique example of gaining her independence by first, overthrowing her own *ancien regime* that had grown like cancer within her socio-political system, and then gaining respect from her former foreign tormentors. Western imperialism played the role as both the conscious oppressor of old China and the unwitting incubator of new China. As Mao Zedong said, though the West was a bully, China treated it as guru and learned how to stand on her own feet in the comity of nations in the Brave New World. Today, it is the people of the West who see China as a spectre without sound basis. Alastair Johnston, in his *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (1995, Princeton University Press) made a typical observation:

> "It seems fairly evident that the operative Chinese strategic culture does not differ radically from key elements in the Western realpolitik tradition. Indeed, the Chinese case might be classified as a hard realpolitik sharing many of the tenets about the nature of enemy and the efficacy of violence as advocates of nuclear war-fighting on both sides in the cold war, or late nineteenth century social Darwinist nationalism."

Johnston's analysis is both right and wrong. He is wrong by sizing up China through the prism of Western historiography, ignoring China's unique development as a "sustainable civilization" and "bounded globalization" through millennia as I have discussed above. He is right by seeing the possibility of China being led astray by the "Western realpolitik" and "social Darwinism" in her nascent quest for modernization in the new era of "unbounded globalization" (not respecting national boundaries).

In order to survive in the modern world where "might is right" still permeates in international affairs, China has learnt to "rise" as a big power, and play big power politics which is by no means assailable. For instance, China decided to develop nuclear weapons in June 1958, at a meeting of the Military Commission. Everyone agreed with Chairman Mao that "if without it [the atom bomb] you are not respected by others [foreign countries]". Mao put it lightly in a do-or-die situation, in the wake of repeated US threats of throwing the atom bomb on Chinese soil. And the Chinese nicknamed the nuclear project as "*zhengqi*", meaning "to gain self respect". But, soon after China succeeded in exploding a nuclear device and retrieved her international dignity and status, she declared the non-first use of the Bomb. Interestingly, when India exploded her nuclear devices in 1998, she was almost driven by similar motivation, i.e. without nuclear weapons, India would be permanently treated as second class power in world affairs.

In order to placate the fear of "the China threat", especially among China's neighbours, the Chinese government has come out with a new slogan of "a peaceful rise". I am not happy about this slogan for it amounts to China tacitly regarding herself as a *rising giant*. Such a frame of mind runs counter to traditional Confucian modesty, and it betrays the lingering existence of this "great power dream" among Chinese ruling elite. Of course, we should understand that this "great power dream" was a Chinese rebound to the erstwhile Western prohibition of "Chinese and dogs" from entering into the public park of Shanghai that was on Chinese soil (though in the so-called "foreign settlement" being impinged on Chinese sovereignty by the imperialist "gunboat diplomacy") and other likely humiliations. However, in the wake of those bygone, China is today virtually a "great power"; hence, the dream has already been realized and is redundant. If China wants to avoid others having any inferiority complex or fear, she should settle down in the comity of nations as one in the crowd of the ordinary and weak, not in the company of the "*more-equal-than-others*" great powers.

In the 1960s, China exhibited bravado in standing up and challenging the two superpowers – the Soviet Union and USA. Mao Zedong, who was a past master of traditional Chinese strategy, ultimately realized the folly of such quixotic vanity, and made up with USA, responding to the unprecedented overture of President Nixon. His successor, Deng Xiaoping, went a step further to refrain from high-profile diplomatic gesture, making China the darling of the developed world. This yielded positive results such as the change of hearts on the part of USSR's sunset leaders – leading to an enduring equitable fraternal Sino-Russian equation during the last quarter of a century that China had never enjoyed even during the Stalin days. Meanwhile, the USA warmed to China both politically and economically, for three and a half decades, despite intensive China-baiting from both conservative and liberal lobbies in Washington and other American centres. While all this may have been to the advantage of China, she has also faded in her image as a trusted ally of the oppressed and developing world.

Even more worrisome is China's eyeing of an illusory goal for great power that is divorced from reality. As a mini-globe, large parts of China are facing serious problems from poverty and backwardness to environmental deterioration. Disparity of income and living standards is skyrocketing, creating an unenviable situation of affluent oases being intruded by hundreds of millions of migrated labourers from

the countryside. In the Maoist era China had virtually eliminated theft and crime. Today, Chinese cities are fast becoming a reminder of London, New York, Chicago etc. During the period of the "primitive accumulation" of capitalist development – hardly any compliment for China's experiment of "socialism along the Chinese road". Meanwhile, China's "great power" image now is hardly supported by real strength. It would take China half a century to reach the *critical mass* of a great power. China is now facing a serious challenge in her onward march with diverse incentives distracting her concentration.

It is vitally important that China desist from unbecoming attractions and provide good living conditions, social security, happiness, and upscaling opportunities for one fifth of humanity. It is gratifying that the Chinese authorities have, two years ago, prescribed this as their goal of governance. This is phrased in Chinese as "*quanmian jianshe xiaokang shehui*", meaning "to construct a well-to-do society universally" for everyone and every family within China. If China can materialize such a goal, not only a part of the earth is well off, but the mainstream world might depart from its habitual predatory mood of globalization.

Sudan Cries Rape

Former Captives Recount the Crime of Boy Rape in Sudan

Maria Sliwa

As he began speaking, Majok lowered his small cocoa-colored eyes and stared intensely at the ground. It was the summer of 2002 and I had just flown thousands of miles deep into the war zone of Sudan, the largest country in Africa, to interview former slaves.

Majok, then 12, tightly hugged his long, bony legs, as we sat on the parched termite-infested earth. His ragged black shorts and ripped oversized T-shirt hung loosely on his spindly, dust-covered body. A continuous flow of tears poured down his precious adolescent face, as he spoke of the way he was repeatedly raped and sodomized by gangs of government soldiers.

"They raped me," Majok cried. "And when I tried to refuse, they beat me." After taking care of his master's cattle all day, Majok said he was often raped at night. He told me that his rapes were very painful and he would rarely get a full night's sleep.

He also spoke about the other slave boys he saw who suffered his same fate. "I saw with my eyes other boys get raped," Majok said. "He [the master] went to collect the other boys and took them to that special place. I saw them get raped."

Yal, another adolescent, had multiple scars on his arms and legs that he said came from the numerous bamboo beatings he received while in captivity. He told me he saw three slaves killed and one whose arm was hacked off at the elbow because he tried to run away. Yal also said he saw other boys raped by his master at his master's house.

"At the time they were raped they were crying the whole day," Yal said. He then told me that he, too, was raped. Since 1989, Sudan's extremist government, which is seated in the North, has been waging war against its diverse populace. The battle is over land, oil, power and religion, by a government that is made up of some of Africa's most aggressive Arab Islamists, says Jesper Strudsholm, Africa correspondent for Politiken.

Animist and Christian black Africans in Southern Sudan and the Nuba Mountains, have paid a price for refusing to submit to the North. Over 2 million have died as a result of this war, according to the U.S. Committee for Refugees. Often trapped in the fray, are surviving victims the government soldiers

capture as slaves. Human rights and local tribal groups estimate that the number of enslaved people ranges from 14,000 to 200,000.

Though thousands still remain enslaved in the North, since 2003, the genocide and slave raiding in South Sudan and the Nuba Mountains has been suspended because of a ceasefire. Amnesty International, however, reports that the government continues to attack black African Muslims in Darfur, Western Sudan. According to Sudan expert, Eric Reeves, more than 1,000 people are dying every week in Darfur because of government attacks, and "the numbers are sure to rise." Amnesty also reports that surviving victims have been raped and abducted by government soldiers during these raids. International law recognizes both slavery and rape in the context of armed conflict as "crimes against humanity."

As I questioned the former slaves, village leaders, my translators, and many Sudanese immigrants living in the United States, it became apparent that the tribal society in which Majok and the other slaves were born has strict taboos about sex—especially male-to-male sex. I was told that although many villagers are aware that young male slaves are raped while in captivity, it isn't discussed because of the cultural prohibitions on all forms of male-to-male sex—including rape.

In fact, male-to-male sex is considered such an egregious act in South Sudan that if two males are found guilty of having consensual sex with each other they are killed by a firing squad. According to Aleu Akechak Jok, an appellate court judge for the South, if a male is found guilty of raping a male or female, only the perpetrator is shot to death.

Jok's description of Southern Sudan's punishment for consensual male-to-male sex is not too different from Sharia law in Northern Sudan, which imposes a death penalty on those found guilty of homosexuality. Village leaders told me that male rape victims, who are able to escape slavery in the North and return to their villages, often consign themselves to a life filled with guilt, suffering silently and alone.

"This affects their minds badly," Nhial Chan Nhial, a chief of one of the villages in Gogrial County said, with anger. "When they return to us, many of these boys have fits of crying, mental problems, and are unable to marry later on in life."

I worried about Majok and the other boys I had interviewed. These boys were all adolescents and pre-adolescents. Many of them told me that their violent experience of rape was their very first introduction to sex. When captured, Ayiel, 14, said he was forced to watch the gang-rape of his two sisters and says he too was raped numerous times. He described his experience as "very painful," and said he never saw his sisters again after that incident.

Perhaps the most graphic account of male rape was given by Aleek. "I watched my master and four Murahaleen [soldiers] violently gang-rape a young Dinka slave boy," Aleek said. "The boy was screaming and crying a lot. He was bleeding heavily, as he was raped repeatedly. I watched his stomach expand with air with each violent penetration. The boy kept screaming. I was very frightened, and knew I was likely next. Suddenly the boy's screams stopped as he went completely unconscious. My master took him to the hospital. I never saw him again."

Many of the boys told me that in order to avoid rape some of the male slaves tried to escape, but were quickly hunted down by their captors. They said that the punishment for resisting rape is severe beatings, limb amputation or death.

Mohammed, a Bagarra nomad, who has helped to free slaves, broke down in tears as he spoke. "What they are doing in the North is against the Koran," he explained. "Allah says that no man should be a slave to another man, but all should be a slave to Allah." Mohammed said that as a Muslim he was heartbroken the extremists have perverted his religion into a political weapon to torture and oppress people.

When I arrived in Sudan, Ngong—one in a group of five former female slaves that I interviewed—told me that children were raped while in captivity.

"Yes, I saw with my eyes them raped, boys and girls," Ngong said. Though I knew about the rape of slave girls, I did not know this could also be happening to boys. I decided to investigate this further when two females from the same group said they had seen slave boys taken away at night to the "special place" for rape.

I interviewed a total of 15 male slaves, for one to two hours each. *Six* of the boys interviewed said they *were raped* and the majority of these six said they were eyewitnesses to other boys being raped. Most of these six boys said they were raped numerous times, by more than one perpetrator. Some of the boys gave the full names and the home towns of the men they said had raped them.

Though *five* in this group of 15 boys said they *were not raped*, they did say they were either sexually harassed or were eyewitnesses to other slave boys being raped. Only *four* of the 15 boys interviewed said they were not raped or sexually harassed, and were not eyewitnesses to the rape of other boys. All of the boys said they were never sexually abused or raped prior to their enslavement.

In 2004, the rape of boy slaves is not unique to young Sudanese males, as recently exposed in a "CNN Presents" documentary "Easy Prey: Inside the Child Sex Trade." Sadly, the ugly arm of slavery reaches far beyond Sudan and shockingly touches every continent except Antarctica. Slavery expert Kevin Bales of Free the Slaves (*FreeTheSlaves.net*) says there are approximately 27 million slaves worldwide. To date, however, there has been no comprehensive report on how many male slaves have been traumatized by rape.

Reflections on the Politics of the Formation of the Government of National Unity in the Sudan:

Some Lessons the SPLM Leadership must Learn

John G Nyuot Yoh

After several weeks of heated debate between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), the formation of the Government of National Unity (GONU) in Sudan on 20 September 2005, has revealed four important lessons which the SPLM leadership must carefully study and take some actions on. Firstly, the debate over who should take charge of the Ministry of Energy and Mining has sidelined the central role of the SPLM as the guardian of the Sudan's transformation and the guarantor of the Southern Sudanese rights in a united transformed Sudan. The SPLM's ideological and philosophical tenets of change and transformation - from a decadent, corrupt old Sudan, where the leadership's main objective has been to accumulate wealth, manipulate poor people's sentiments in the name of religion and Arab chauvinism, using political Islam as a means to rule the country, to a Sudan where the ordinary Sudanese is the main focus of the government - were blurred by the politics around the Energy and Mining issue. The NCP leadership was and is aware that the oil is in the South and knows that the SPLM has the right to be allocated the Ministry. What the NCP had on its side was time. It knew that the SPLM needed to gain time, and that was what the NCP used against it.

Throughout the negotiations over the Energy Ministry, the SPLM was forced to concentrate on the South, so that its real potential as the main political catalyst for the transformation of the Sudan could be watered down. The SPLM is seen by Sudanese as the vehicle and instrument of change in the country. The fact that the NCP managed to make the SPLM look like a localist Southern party during the negotiations, was a big blow to the SPLM's image as a national progressive movement. The SPLM must take immediate remedial action to correct this perception. One way to do so would be to become directly

involved in peace negotiations with Darfurians and Easterners and to make sure that their shares in power are secured. The New Sudan ideology was never about the distribution of positions or power; it was about equality and the just distribution of these positions. Most importantly it was about bringing change to the whole country – one in which every Sudanese, feels Sudanese, and deserves a government of which she/he can be proud.

There is no doubt that the SPLM, as the guardian of change in the country, was hard hit by the death of Dr John Garang. However, the unity and the collective approach which the new SPLM leadership showed during August – September 2005, was so strong that, had its leadership concentrated on its national agenda, by not only negotiating on behalf of the South, but also on behalf of all the progressive political forces in the country, it would have won more substantial positions, not only for the South, but also for the Darfurians, the Easterners and the NDA, as its natural allies. What the Al-Beshir-Taha Alliance did, was to show the SPLM that the NCP is the main power broker in the country, that it is the NCP that offers positions, and that therefore any talk of power and wealth-sharing should be determined, not by the provisions of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), but by new negotiations with the NCP. The SPLM has therefore committed itself to an open-ended approach to continuous negotiations over government positions, commissions and the financial rows that will most certainly follow. It therefore does not make sense that the SPLM allowed the NCP to take the Ministries of Defence, Interior, Finance, Energy and Mining and Justice, when it is clear that such control over power and wealth sharing in the CPA had been coveted by the NCP. It also means that the provision that unity should be made attractive to Southerners during the interim period, will no longer have meaning, not only to Southerners, but also to other political groups in the country who feel that the CPA is a good document that could be applied to their situations.

The SPLM leadership may be convinced that the NCP was playing for time, knowing that it is the SPLM that will have to bring back hundreds of thousands of returnees and displaced persons to the South. Furthermore, it is the SPLM that will need to deliver essential services to the people of the South. They should not have wasted time negotiating positions with people who have no respect for agreements. Even if the above fears are genuine, there is no reason why the SPLM should have given up all the most important economic and political positions to the NCP, thus creating the impression that every time a new round of negotiations comes - and there will be many of them - the SPLM will give in because the NCP is not interested in implementing the CPA.

Secondly, the formation of the Government of National Unity has also revealed that while the decision-making process within the SPLM leadership has improved compared to what it used to be, the manner in which positions were announced, without the knowledge of 80% of those who were appointed, points to the fact that something seriously needs to be revised in that process. Some members of the movement were allocated positions, which they, had they been informed, might not have accepted or, if given the choice, would have declined. While the SPLM line-up is representative, regionally and ethnically, the nature of the line-up, especially its technical aspects, leaves much to be desired.

The SPLM leadership should make it very clear to its members who are appointed in the Government of National Unity, that they are given assignments to represent the movement, not themselves. This could be done in two ways: by recalling all those who are appointed in GONU to Juba, for a week of political briefing where the whole leadership, plus the Southern Assembly present the SPLM ministers in GONU with a code of conduct and advise them to work as a team, rather than as individuals. In the second place, the SPLM leadership may as well ask its representatives in GONU to report to Juba for briefing every two

months. If this is not done, it will be like sending these men and women into exile, where each of them will find him or herself alone within the next year or so, cornered by NCP petro-dollar politics.

Some of the SPLM members in GONU have protested, because they felt that they deserve higher positions than the ones they have been appointed to. Others strongly felt that the communities and the nationalities they come from were allocated very junior positions, compared to their real political and numerical sizes. Others complained that some individual members of the Movement were allocated senior positions in GONU, which should have been allocated to more senior members who had joined the Movement earlier. One of the explanations given by certain members of the SPLM leadership to answer some of these complaints, was that some of these senior SPLM members do not want to work in the North. The question then is, if these members have already informed the leadership, directly or indirectly, of their intention not to work in the North, why allocate to them positions in the North? These issues should be carefully studied by the leadership, and if it has not already allocated positions in the government of Southern Sudan and in governments of states, it has to widen its consultations and inform those it intends to deploy.

Most importantly, those who are currently advising the SPLM leadership should open their eyes and ears widely, because the SPLM-NCP partnership is supposed to avoid focus on the distribution of positions, and concentrate on creating true change in the lives of the people of Sudan and the South in particular. Giving the impression that the sole aim of the SPLM-NCP partnership is to buy people's loyalty with positions will definitely defeat the purpose of the SPLM/A struggle, for which millions have died, while millions of others are waiting to go home and find real changes there. This is the real challenge facing the SPLM leadership.

Thirdly, the lesson which the SPLM should learn from the politics of the formation of GONU is that whenever a leadership of an organisation preoccupies itself with procedures and takes a longer time negotiating political issues, the other parts of the organisation tend to become paralyzed. This is always the case in a centralised system, where members of the movement are waiting in anticipation of orders and are not participating in decision making. The SPLM leadership should start to divide roles among its members - and it has lots of qualified people to take up such roles. Only if the leadership and its advisors look around them and spread the net wider, beyond their immediate surroundings, will a good and healthy solution be found.

Indeed, it was impressive that once it became clear that the NCP was buying time, the SPLM leadership correctly decided to speed up the process of the formation of constitutional structures in the South. It could have been done faster and better. When the SPLM and NCP were busy negotiating positions, the NCP was busy emptying the treasury of the national economy and enriching its cronies and potential allies. The SPLM should have appointed a shadow caretaker government of its own, during the pre-interim period to work with the NCP. The SPLM did appoint one person to deal with the NCP as a contact person; however, it should have appointed a representative in every ministry in central government to monitor activities there. In fact, the NCP caretaker government had done many things during the past six months that it would not have done, even when it was still a government.

During the negotiations, the NCP was busy signing contracts, cementing its international relations and indeed emptying the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of staff by deploying them in all corners of the world, in anticipation that the SPLM will find all the embassy and consulate positions already filled, hence leaving no room for the new minister to employ Southerners and members from the other marginalised areas in such positions. The SPLM leadership should therefore come up with a new mechanism through which a

selected dedicated group of its members are allocated responsibilities to monitor every aspect of the CPA. Each of these members should be assigned specific tasks, which relate to the implementation of the peace agreement. Thus when any new rounds of negotiations with the NCP commence, the group will have worked out all the modalities, and time is not spent on minor issues which should be delegated to technocrats within the Movement.

Fourthly, the formation of the national government has revealed that the SPLM needs to strengthen its information and international affairs units. The SPLM should, on a daily basis, inform the international community and those African countries that had guaranteed and witnessed the peace agreement, on the process of the implementation of the peace agreement. SPLM diplomats should be assigned the specific task to keep the world informed about the delays the NCP creates on a daily basis. Sudan TV and Radio were definitely supportive of the NCP position on the negotiations over the positions in GONU and the printed media was biased, to the extent of disinformation. International community representatives in Khartoum were given on a daily basis, the impression that the Energy and Mining fiasco was actually under control and that that department was going to be allocated to the SPLM.

The disinformation campaign was so well organized that the each senior member of the NCP played his role to perfection. Only Al-Beshir and Taha were not allowed to make any statements over the issue, except when they were cornered by the independent media, otherwise they avoided interviews. The impression was given in the media that Nafie and Khalifa were the chief negotiators of the NCP. The reality was that Taha was the main reference point from the government side. Everybody else who is significant in the NCP was asked to play a role in the disinformation campaign.

As a result, important issues such as peace in Darfur, the frozen negotiations in the East and the drafting of the constitution of Southern Sudan were sidelined in the media for almost a month and a half. The SPLM has always been very weak in its information and propaganda wing. For the time being, the SPLM will need to collaborate with the existing Southern private newspapers and start efforts towards the establishment of a national TV and radio station in Juba. Such a project would not require much effort since the South is endowed with experienced and well-trained journalists and technicians. Until such time that engineers could be recruited from abroad to run the stations, Southern technicians will perform that task. A call from President Salva Kiir and his Deputy Dr Riek Machar, to the talented Southern journalists, to assemble in Juba to plan for the establishment of TV and radio stations that would cover the whole of Sudan, will be sufficient. These are some of the serious lessons to be learned by the SPLM leadership, which at the same time represent timely warnings about difficult times ahead.

Not Just Another Memoir

A Brief Review of "Are You With Us?" by Mxolisi Mgxashe (Ace)

(Mafube & Tafelberg. 2006)

Marcus M. Balintulo

On April 6, this book was launched in Cape Town at a well-attended function hosted by Exclusive Books. This was the first of several launches that were held in Gauteng and subsequently in Durban. The two speakers at the Cape Town launch, Pallo Jordan and Dumisa Ntsebeza, both hailed the publication of this work as a welcome addition to the reservoir of historical memory of the struggle for the liberation of South Africa.

Since the publication of the book, several events have occurred that are related to the focus of Ace's book. One was the untimely passing of the Pan-African Congress of South Africa (PAC) stalwart ,Mr Vusumzi Linda Make who was eulogized as a dedicated comrade and visionary, whose passing represented a significant loss not only to the PAC, but to the entire country and the African continent as a whole. The other relevant event has been the recent publication of Zarina Maharaj's "Dancing to a Different Rhythm, a Memoir".

While this book shares, to some degree with Mr Mgxashe's account, the "desperation and anguish of exile", the two essentially belong to two different genres. Ace's narrative has no pretensions to being an account of the experiences of "an aristocrat of the struggle", *a la* Zarina's husband Mac. Nor does he claim any ensuing cathartic effect from his creative endeavour. On the contrary, the controversy around the publication of his book reveals, in no uncertain manner, the asymmetrical power dynamics surrounding the entire enterprise of intellectual production.

In our view, what distinguishes Mgxashe's fascinating narrative from the standard autobiography is that the author's life history is cast as a platform through which a myriad of *dramatis personae*, in his own words mainly "the unsung heroes and heroines of the struggle for freedom, democracy and justice", are assembled and profiled from the vantage point of the relevance and implications of their praxis. Through this rather unorthodox and novel methodology, a series of themes and sub-themes are explored or introduced in a preliminary fashion. What are some of these themes?

The overarching major theme is essentially the hitherto unexplained dismal failure of the PAC to realize its enthusiasts' belief that "their organization was going to take over the reigns from the National Party and install an 'African Socialist Democratic' regime. One of the consequences of this failure from a national perspective is the absence of a credible, opposition formation and voice during the critical phase of transition.

Clearly the dynamic and revolutionary thrust in the spirit of the founders of the PAC, projected onto the opposition benches of our young democratic parliament, would have filled a huge gap in our politics of transition in which the locus of significant dynamics has tended to be around the relationships between the alliance partners rather than between the government and opposition. The only expectations since the dawn of democracy in 1994 have been at the provincial and local layers of government in the Western Cape and KwaZulu Natal. The extent of the opportunity cost of this gap, to the country and continent, is by definition immeasurable.

The author's narrative unfolds against the background of the variegated, South African mosaic of dichotomies: black and white; rural and urban; native and settler; rich and poor; traditional and western; oppressor and oppressed; exploiter and exploited. Now, the author's growing-up experiences open up for the reader, a window to the complexity of this socially constructed and largely racially over-determined reality. Through the succinct description of personal encounters and interactions in the context of struggle activism, the author succeeds in portraying the oppressive and dehumanizing nature of inter group relations in mid-twentieth century Cape Town and the rest of the country.

Within this fabric, the reader is treated to fascinating insights into family relationships, peer group cultures, personal dilemmas that testify to the destructive nature of racial oppression and the resoluteness of spirit among the activists, notwithstanding the political naivety and internecine fractiousness. The latter provides a sharp contrast to the impressive spirit of solidarity, which characterized relationships across party allegiancies in that extreme of total institutions namely, Robben Island. What holds the narrative together with some degree of coherence through the plethora of perspectives, ideas and actions of the many activists and agents of the regime, is the sense of commitment to the just-cause of national liberation, contraposed to a sense of betrayal and disappointment at the failure of the PAC. This failure in the author's account can be ascribed to at combination of at least three factors:

1. A crisis of leadership that followed the incarceration of Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe;
2. Lack of a revolutionary strategy, and planning based upon the rather naïve belief that a quasi-Blanquist, violent mass insurrection would flush the oppressive settler regime into the sea;
3. The sheer brutality of the regime and its ability to mobilize state resources, as well as its ability to coopt some members of the oppressed groups to serve as agents for their oppressive and criminal agenda.

Understandably the book is punctuated by explosions of passion, anger and disappointment. But all these are mitigated by a rich sense of humour, which runs through the entire work and prevents the disappointment from degenerating into self-pity and cynicism.

Besides the fact that this is only the first volume of the author's story which covers the pre-exile and early exile phase, he owes us the rest of the account. In that future volume, hopefully some of the sub-themes which he raises, but does not develop, will be revisited. Two of these are the question of the role of

traditional belief systems in situations of cataclysmic intergroup conflict. Here, he alludes to comparisons with other anti-colonial rebellions e.g. the Mau Mau in Kenya. Another undeveloped sub-theme is the question of asymmetrical gender relations, particularly the marginalization of women within the PAC, especially given the author's own passion for women's liberation.

Ace's final plea is for national unity in progressing the national democratic revolution, and the sharing of past experiences even by those who betrayed their comrades. He believes that the jury is still out on our transition. He still is hopeful of a future PAC revival albeit under a different label and needless to say different leadership. Yet some of the combatants profiled in his book are still living abroad as they believe that 'It is Not Yet Uhuru'. It may also be the case that President Mbeki's African, continental Renaissance-initiative, which Ace acknowledges with admiration, may have narrowed the space for any possibility of a serious PAC-based revival.

Finally, this is an important book for both young and old because while the former will learn a lot about an important phase of the struggle for liberation, the latter will be treated to a lot of, hitherto little known details, about events and people they used to know. Indeed, one is tempted to follow up this aspect with a motivation for a research piece on - 'Where are they now?'. What is also a certainty is that the title of the next volume will have to be reconsidered, since asking the question, 'Are You With Us?' or 'Are You Still With Us?' in the current context, may itself be problematic.

On a personal note I must say that I enjoyed reading this book not only because of my familiarity with some of the role players, but because it revealed some of the connections between events that happened in the former Transkei during the Matanzima dictatorship and tyranny and events in Cape Town. (Or a minor editorial note, the reference to Gideon Vakalisa and Vakasa on page 172, both of which are incorrect, should be Gideon Vakala.)

In Defence of our Cultural Belongings.

Review of "The Institution of Chieftaincy in Ghana - The Future" by Oseadeeyo Addo Dankwa III, Paramount Chief of Akuapem Traditional Area

(Published with the Support of Konrad Adenauer Foundation. Gold Type Ltd. Accra. 2004.)

Kwesi Kwaa Prah

In our times, the institution of traditional leadership in Africa is under strain and pressure from different quarters. On the one hand, there are those who regard it as an atavism which needs to be dropped; on the other hand, there are others who argue that we abandon the institutions of traditional authority at our cultural peril, that it is too closely intertwined with all that we have as Africans to be dropped or abandoned. Many other views fall in between the two positions, and the fact that the issue is being currently discussed all over Africa, sometimes with intense passion, makes the significance of this text very timely.

Oseadeeyo Addo Dankwa III's slim volume represents a robust exercise in advocacy and clarification of the institution of chieftaincy in Ghana. Its relevance, however, extends far beyond the borders of Ghana. Indeed, we can say that it is a defence of the argument in favour of maintaining traditional leadership, in revised forms, in all parts of Africa. It is based on knowledge from direct experience and close familiarity with the institution in Ghana. At the same time, the author draws on other experiences and literature from further afield. The text is written in lucid and uncomplicated language. It therefore reads quickly and easily.

The size of the volume however is misleading because although it is small in size, it packs a lot of information and makes a punchy delivery. The table of contents is thin and sells the text short. The reader is not given a full idea of what is on offer. For example, under Chapter Two, "Who is a Chief?", the author deals with definitional issues; the kingmaking process, general expectations, problems of chieftaincy, solutions and duties of a Chief. Chapter Three, in the table of contents is itemized as "Chieftaincy Administration". In the text, the reader is treated to a variety of issues like the administrative set-up, sub-Chiefs and their functions, Durbar arrangements, traditional councils and the Oman council. All in all, the text is much richer than can be gleaned from the table of contents. It would have been better to have a more structured and detailed table of contents.

Another problem with the text is that referencing is patchy and inconsistent. It is arguable whether this text needs elaborate scholastic referencing. I happen not to think so. However, if we are referencing, then we must be consistent and carry it diligently throughout the text. For example on page 11, Rattray is well referenced and listed in the back of the book, in the Bibliography. J.H. Driberg is elsewhere quoted without reference. I was left guessing if it is from his book called, "At Home with the Savage". Chancellor Williams is cited but not properly referenced. In addition to these shortcomings, there were little slips like the fact that Eva Meyerowitz's name is spelt wrongly on page 58, and on page 59 "shattering microcosm". In spite of these minor discrepancies, the central wisdom which should be emphasized in the message of this text, is what Oseadeeyo Addo Dankwa III describes in the following words; "In our fast moving society, the chieftaincy institution can only survive if it adapts itself to changing conditions. Some people wrongly believe that the myths surrounding Chieftaincy are what enable the institution to enjoy power and respectability and that any attempts at demystification of the institution will harm its prestige. On the contrary, hanging on to the outmoded myths will, in future, render the institution irrelevant to the society it is supposed to serve. For the institution to be accepted by majority of the members of the present-day society, the many mysticisms bordering on religion must be given a second look."(P. xvii). The message is clear, and Ghanaians can be proud of their learned, eloquent and wise Chief Oseadeeyo Addo Dankwa III. This text makes educative reading.

CONTRIBUTORS

Sipho Seepe is Academic Director, Henley Management College, Johannesburg, South Africa.

Paul Tiyambe Zeleza is Professor of an Economic Historian and a Novelist. He won the Noma Award in 1994 for his book, *A Modern Economic History of Africa.*

Kwesi Kwaa Prah is Director of the Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS).

Judith S. Sawyerr is a member of the Greater Accra branch of the Ghana National Education Campaign Coalition. She was for many years Headmistress of the International School in Accra.

Oluyemi Olaniyan, is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Music, Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria .

Tan Chung (b.1929) was former co-chairman of Institute of Chinese Studies. He was born in Malaysia, and raised in China. Tan Chung taught in Delhi University and Jawaharlal Nehru University as Professor of Chinese. From 1999 to date, he has been an academic associate attached to the Centre for East Asian Studies of the University of Chicago, Illinois, USA.

Maria Sliwa, founder of Freedom Now News (FreeWorldNow.com), lectures on slavery and is preparing for publication the interviews she conducted on slave boy rape while in Sudan.

John G. Nyuot Yoh is a post-graduate student and teaches African and International Politics, Department of Political Sciences at the University of South Africa in Pretoria.

Marcus Balintulo was for years Vice-Chancellor of the Cape Technikon in Cape Town, South Africa. He is by training, a Sociologist with wide experience in Botswana, Nigeria and the West Indies.

CASAS BOOK SERIES LIST
(Published or in press)

Kindly visit our website at www.casas.co.za for a complete list of our Publications.

Book Series No.

1 Between Distinction and Extinction: The Harmonization and Standardization of African Languages.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah (ed.)

2. Knowledge in Black and White: The Impact of Apartheid on the Production and Reproduction of Knowledge
Kwesi Kwaa Prah (ed.)

3. Ibibio Phonetics & Phonology.
Eno-Abasi Essien Urua

4. Rethinking African Arts and Culture
Dele Layiwola (ed.)

5. Language and Institutions in Africa.
Sinfree Makoni & Nkonko Kamwangamalu (eds)

6. The New Orthography: Based on the Gbe Uniform Standard Orthography (GUSO).
Hounkpati B.C. Capo

7. African Languages for the Mass Education of Africans.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah

8. Mother Tongue for Scientific and Technological Development in Africa.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah

9. *Nyansapɔw.*
James Gyekye-Aboagye

10. Education, Literacy and Development in Africa.
Sassongo J. Silue.

11. Isefe Ninu Awon Ere-onitan Yorùba.
Arinpe Gbekelolu Adejumo

12. Language Across Borders.
Felix Banda

13 Ifá and Related Genres.
Lawrence Olúfemi Adéwolé

14. Globalising Africans.
Bankie Forster Bankie

15. Akan Nsɛmfuasekyerɛ.
J. Gyekye-Aboagye, S.A. Gyima, L.A. Okraku, R.M. Opong, S.K. Coleman, A.O. Boakye

16. A Linguistic Analysis of ciNsenga: A Bantu Language Spoken in Zambia and Malawi.
Lazarus Miti

17. Kiswahili Katika Karne ya Ishirini na Moja.
Kimani Njogu, Kitula King'ei, Clara Momanyi, Paul Musau

18. Rehabilitating African Languages.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah (ed.)

19. Harmonisation and Standardisation of Nigerian Languages. *F.O. Egbokhare and S.O. Oyetade (eds)*

20. New Perspectives in Edoid Studies: Essays in Honour of Ronald Peter Schaefer
Ohioma I. Pogosan and Francis O. Egbokhare (eds)

21. Speaking African: African Languages for Education and Development.
Francis R. Owino (ed.)

22. Speaking in Unison: The Harmonisation and Standardisation of Southern African Languages.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah (ed.)

23. Racism and the Global African Experience. CASAS / NGO Forum.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah

24. Discourses on Difference. Discourses on Oppression.
Norman Duncan, Pumla Dineo Gqola, Murray Hofmeyr, Tamara Shefer, Felix Malunga, Mashudu Mashige

25. Writing African: The Harmonisation of Orthographic Conventions in African Languages.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah (ed.)

26. Aspects of Cinsenga Tonology.
Lazarus M. Miti

27. Ikale Masquerade Traditions and Artifacts.
Ebenezer Aiku Sheba

28. Akan Kasakoa Horow Bi
J. Gyekye-Aboagye

29. Les Langues Africaines Pour L'education des Masses en Afrique.
Kwesi Kwaa Prah

30. (Forthcoming) Isènbáyé Àti Ìlò Èdè Yorùbá
Olasope O. Oyelaran & Lawrence O. Adewole

31. Fɔlɔ Maninkaw.
Boniface Keita

32. Unifying Southern African Languages: Harmonization and Standardization.
A. Chebanne/M.Jowkweni/L.Mokitimi/ S.Ngubane

33. Chasing Futures: Africa in the 21st Century – Problems and Prospects.
K.K. Prah (ed).

34. Silenced Voices: Studies of Minority Languages of Southern Africa.
K.K. Prah (ed)

35. Reflections of Arab-led Slavery on Africans.
K.K. Prah (ed)

36. (Forthcoming). The Yorùbá Auxiliary Verb.
Lawrence Adewole

37. A General Introduction to Ndebele Grammar.
Langa Khumalo

38. Pourquoi le Gabon doit investir sur ses langues vernaculaires.
Daniel Franck Idiata

39. Languages of Instruction for African Emancipation
Birgit Brock-Utne & Rodney Kofi Hopson (eds)

40. Comparative Bantu Phonology and Morphology.
Lazarus M. Miti

42. The Challenges of Using African Languages at School.
Daniel Franck Idiata

NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

Submission of Papers

Papers should be sent to the Editor, TINABANTU, The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society (CASAS), P.O. Box 359, Rondebosch, Cape Town, South Africa. Tel. +27-21-689-9217. Fax +27-21-685-0332. E-mail casas@casas.co.za

Authors should submit *three* copies of their paper, typed and doubled spaced on A4, retaining a fourth copy for their own use. Papers should be between 5000 and 8000 words in length and a word count must be provided. An abstract of not more than 100 words and four key words should also be included. A copy of the article in electronic form will be required if accepted for publication. The author's name and address should be typed on a separate page at the beginning of the paper. Contributors should also send the Editor a paragraph of bio-data.

Papers accepted for review are evaluated anonymously by at least two referees. The final decision on publication rests with the Editor.

It is assumed that submitted articles have not been published elsewhere and that they are not under consideration for publication by other journals. The author should state whether s/he is publishing related articles elsewhere. Articles are considered for publication on the understanding that the author retains his/her copyright. Authors will be asked to sign a copyright agreement to this effect. All authors should agree to this assignment. For jointly authored papers the senior author may sign an agreement on behalf of the co-author, provided that he or she obtains their written consent for copyright assignment. Where copyright is not owned by the author(s), e.g. where an article was written by an author in the course of his/her employment, the form should be signed by the copyright holder's authorized agent. The copyright assignment form and notes accompanying it will be sent to the author by the Editor when the paper is accepted for publication. If you would like to see a copy of the form and notes about assignment in advance please contact the Editor at The Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society. Requests for permission to reproduce any part of papers published in *Tinabantu – Journal of African National Affairs* should be addressed to the Editor.

Style

Notes should be numbered in the body of the text consecutively and presented as Endnotes at the end of the article. Such Endnotes should include, wherever relevant: the **Name** of the **Author**, **Surname** and **Firstnames** or **initials**; the **Title** of the article/book; the **Publisher**; the **Place** of publication; the **Year** of publication; and the relevant **Page(s)**.

Endnotes can also be made up of commentary or further explanations for the cited or numbered text.